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Abstract 
The purpose of this MBA Project is to investigate and provide an analysis of 
the prominent factors that affect the United States Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
program. This project was conducted with the sponsorship and assistance of the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program, Financial Management 
and International programs. The overall goal of this project is three-fold: 1) To 
identify the purpose of the United States FMS program and its processes 2) To 
identify, define and evaluate historical economic, political, social and industrial 
changes and trends that affect FMS worldwide allocation and support and 3) To 
apply these findings to a specific country (Taiwan) to make a prediction of future 
participation and support. 
The role of arms sales in world politics has grown tremendously since the end 
of World War II and more specifically since the passage of new arms laws in 1979. 
The importance of FMS is increasingly evident in the foreign policies of both supplier 
and recipient nations, in international politics, competition and relations. Arms sales 
have become in recent years a crucial dimension of international affairs. This paper 
examines several trends in military equipment, services and training exchanges and 
investigates their potential impact on the future conflicts. The nature of FMS is 
complex. This research plans to identify and analyze trends relating to socio-
political, economic, and industrial and technological changes associated with FMS 
spending. This discussion then applies these findings to Taiwan as a case study and 
expands on the customer’s experience with FMS. The intent of this paper is to 
increase the reader's knowledge of FMS, pinpoint trends in the program and use 
FMS to Taiwan as a point of comparison to increase comprehension of this 
extremely complex and not well-understood program. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter of the research report covers the background, problem statement, 
purpose of study, research questions, methodology, limitations, definitions, significance 
of study and report overview.  The objective of this chapter is to create a clear and 
concise understanding of the research problem, its significance and how the problem will 
be analyzed.  This introduction chapter establishes a foundation and roadmap for the 
subsequent chapters. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The role of arms sales in world politics has grown tremendously since the end of 
World War II and more specifically since the passage of new arms laws such as the Arms 
Export Control Act in 1979.1  The importance of Foreign Military Sales is increasingly 
evident in the foreign policies of both supplier and recipient nations2, in international 
politics3, competition and relations. Arms sales have become in recent years a crucial 
dimension of international affairs. 4  This paper examines several trends in military 
equipment, services and training exchanges and investigates their potential impact on 
the conduct of conflict in the future. The nature of Foreign Military Sales is complex. 
This research plans to identify and analyze trends relating to socio-political, economic, 
industrial and technological changes associated with Foreign Military Sales spending.  
These findings will then be applied to Taiwan as a case study in order to expand on the 
customers’ experience with Foreign Military Sales. The intent of this paper is to increase 
                                                 
1 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Chapter 9, 
Oct. 2006, 1 May 2007, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/greenbook.htm>. 
2 U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 
1995,” 3 May 2007, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/reports1.htm>. 
3Richard R. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Developing Nations, 1996-2003, 
Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2004).   
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the reader's knowledge of Foreign Military Sales, pinpoint trends in the program and use 
Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan as a point of comparison to increase comprehension of 
this extremely complex and not well-understood program.   
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
While there is meticulous information on the monetary value and type of 
equipment, services and training purchased by foreign countries through the FMS 
program, there is little research linking this data to the economic state of being, political 
shifts of power, social movements or industrial advancements both domestically and 
foreign.  Additionally, there is minimal research available which analyzes the trends 
affecting FMS as well as perspectives of customers.  This research effort plans to bridge 
the gap in information by identifying the predominant environmental factors, correlating 
trends and addressing issues from a customer’s perspective as associated with the FMS 
program. 
D. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to establish and analyze the predominant trends that 
impact the FMS program in an effort to provide information to policy makers and 
governmental leadership for incorporation into future strategy and policy.  This 
information can be utilized to improve our strategic position within the world.  Equipped 
with the knowledge provided by a detailed trend analysis, the FMS organization can 
make better informed decisions concerning defense security and cooperation strategies. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In this report, the research team seeks to provide the data to answer the following 
questions: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
4Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Appendix 2 
History of Security Assistance, Oct 2006, 21 Apr 2007, 
<http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/20%20Appendix%202.pdf>.  
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1. Foreign Military Sales 
What are the mission, roles and history of the FMS program?  
2. Socio-Political 
How do changes in domestic threat conditions affect FMS? 
What political factors affect FMS?  
How does the shift in power within the House and Senate affect the funding for 
FMS? 
What trends currently exist within FMS, and how have such trends changed since 
the end of the Cold War era? 
How do military budget reductions affect FMS? 
What trends do other countries value with respect to FMS? 
3. Economic 
Do changes in U.S. military expenditures affect FMS? 
How do changes within military doctrine affect FMS? 
Do changes in U.S manpower strength affect FMS? 
4. Technological/Industrial 
How do changes in technological innovation affect FMS? 
How do changes in the domestic Defense Industry affect FMS? 
How do changes within the domestic acquisition process affect FMS? 
How do offset agreements affect FMS? 
5. Taiwan 
How do foreign political situations (Taiwan) affect the size and timing of FMS? 
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What foreign factors affect the FMS program? 
How do changes within FMS affect foreign capabilities? 
How does Taiwan, as a recipient of U.S. FMS, view the program? 
F. METHODOLOGY 
This research project combines statistical analysis and case-study methodology to 
provide an in-depth examination of the United States FMS program.  The case-study 
method was determined the most appropriate research strategy because it allows for 
analysis of a strategically interesting region and adds a program with real-life context. 
The research data, which includes both academic and governmental data, was collected 
using a combination of methods—including literature reviews, telephonic interviews and 
personal interview of United States and Taiwan FMS officials, various governmental 
commercial reports, newspaper and periodical articles.  
G. LIMITATIONS 
The hypersensitivity of political issues associated with Taiwan as a state limited 
access to personal interviews of Taiwanese officials and documents. Specifically, U.S. 
members of the research team were denied country clearance due to sensitivity and 
timing of the research.  Similarly, these sensitivities limited access to classified budgetary 
information from Taiwan.  Additionally, there is minimal availability of U.S. Foreign 
Military Sales program data prior to 1980 because of lack of documentation.  
H. REPORT OVERVIEW 
This report begins with an introduction in Chapter I; this is an overview of the 
background, purpose, and methodology of the discussion and provides a roadmap for the 
entire research effort.  Chapter II then defines Foreign Military Sales through its program 
mission, organizational structure within the United States government and processes.  
Additionally, Chapter II provides a history of the Foreign Military Sales program and 
depicts the significance and magnitude of the program today.  Chapter III looks outside 
the Foreign Military Sales program and identifies predominant environmental factors 
  5
(economic, socio-political, and industrial) affecting program administration. Chapter III 
also statistically examines these factors for applicable trend data analysis to forecast 
future development.  Chapter IV outlines a customer’s perspective of the Foreign 
Military Sales program using Taiwan as a case study.  Thus, Chapter IV explores the 
factors affecting purchases: the benefits, concerns and complications of the program.  
Chapter V brings together the trend analysis from Chapter III and applies it to 
information from Chapter IV—making predictions for the future of Taiwan with respect 
to the Foreign Military Sales program.  Additionally, Chapter V concludes the piece with 
overall conclusions, recommendations and areas for future research. 
  6
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II. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF FMS 
A. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 
1. What is FMS? 
According to governing document DoD 5105.38-M, “the Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) program is that part of Security Assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control 
Act (AECA) and conducted using formal contracts or agreements between the United 
States Government (USG) and an authorized foreign purchaser.”5  Annually the U.S. 
Government appropriates funds that are requested from the President and approved by 
congress to help its allies and foreign countries purchase arms and other defense-related 
articles.  The funds are held in a trust fund which is basically operated as a zero-profit 
revolving or working capital fund.  The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program brochure 
defines FMS as, “the U.S. Government’s program for transferring defense articles, 
services and training to other sovereign nations and international organizations.”6  Thus, 
it is a government-to-government method for selling U.S. defense equipment, services 
and training.  Ideally the program hopes that responsible arms sales will advance national 
security and foreign policy objectives by “strengthening bilateral defense relations, 
supporting coalition building and enhancing interoperability between U.S. forces and 
                                                 
5 United States, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance Management Manual, 
DoD 5105.38-M, (Washington: DoD, 2003) 91. 
6 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “The FMS Advantage: Frequently Asked Questions About 
Foreign Military Sales,” Full Color Brochure, 21 Jan 2004, 10 May 2007 
<http://www.dsca.osd.mil/about_us.htm>. 
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militaries of friends and allies.”7  Figures 1 and 2 describe the financial history of the 
FMS program.  Figure 1 shows the total dollar amount of FMS agreements and deliveries 
per year (in CY 2000 U.S. dollars) from 1980 to 2005.   
                                                 
7 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Foreign Military Sales,” 3 Apr 2007, 10 May 2007 
<http://www.dsca.osd.mil/home/foreign_military_sales.htm>. 
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Figure 1.   Total Foreign Military Sales Budget in U.S. Dollars8 
                                                 
8 FMS figures are drawn from The Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency annual facts books at the Federation of American Scientists website, 
20 Feb 2007, 28 Apr 2007 < http://www.fas.org/main/home.jsp >. 
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Actual FMS deliveries usually take place some years after the agreement has been 
achieved and then take more than one fiscal year to be completed.  This can be observed 
in Figure 1, in which peaks in total amount of FMS agreements are followed over the 
next few years with an increased amount of FMS deliveries.  For example, year 1993 
had the biggest amount of FMS agreements in a 25-year period; and from 1995 to 1999, 
the amount of FMS deliveries was greater than the amount of agreements.  The main 
beneficiaries of the 1993 agreement dollars were Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and Kuwait.  
Figure 2 tracks the Foreign Military Sales dollar value of agreements as a 
percentage of the US Defense Outlays.  The term outlay refers to “actual government 
spending” which occurs through cash, check or electronic funds-transfer payments made 
for the contracts, purchases, and personal services and as grants and loans are executed.9  
Figure 2 depicts the total dollar amount of Foreign Military Sales agreements as a 
percentage of the US Defense Outlays.  Outlays were as much as 18% in 1980, but saw a 
rapid decline from 1983 to 1988 as US Defense Outlays grew due to the Reagan-era U.S. 
military buildup.  After experiencing a spike in 1993 as a reaction to the first Gulf War, 
the percentage stabilized at around 4-6%.  However in recent years, the percentage has 
started to decrease again as the U.S. Defense Outlays grew from the Global War on 
Terror, while the amount of FMS agreements slightly declined. 
                                                 
9 Jerry L. McCaffery and L.R. Jones, Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense 
(Greenwich: Information Age Publishing, 2004) 73. 
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Total FMS Agreements as a Percentage of the US Defense Outlays
 
Figure 2.   Total FMS Agreements as a Percentage of the US Defense Outlays10
                                                 
10 FMS figures are drawn from The Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency annual facts books at the Federation of American Scientists website, 
20 Feb 2007, 28 Apr 2007 < http://www.fas.org/main/home.jsp >. 
Defense outlays are drawn from the US Government Printing Office website, 21 Feb 2007 <www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/sheets/hist02z1.xls>. 
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2. Eligible Participants 
The eligibility of participants in the FMS program is based on Presidential 
determination.  In accordance with AECA, section 3 (reference (c)), the President makes a 
determination as to whether the prospective purchaser is eligible.  Both defense articles 
and/or services may be sold or leased to a country or international organization once 
determined eligible.  Table 1 summarizes the AECA criteria for this determination.11 
 




a.  Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
Before getting too deep into what FMS is and does, it is important to 
understand how it falls into the governmental structure.  The FMS program is one of 
several programs administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). 
The DSCA is a Defense Agency within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
                                                 
11 United States, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance Management Manual, 
DoD 5105.38-M, (Washington: DoD, 2003) 91. 
12 United States, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance Management Manual, 
DoD 5105.38-M, (Washington: DoD, 2003) 91. 
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overseen by the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy as depicted in Figure 3.  The 
DSCA’s mission is to “lead, direct and manage security cooperation programs and 
resources to support national security objectives that build relationships that promote U.S. 
interests; build allied and partner capacities for self-defense and coalition operations in 
the global war on terrorism; and promote peacetime and contingency access for U.S. 
forces.”13   
 
 
Figure 3.   Organization Chart of Defense Agencies14 
 
As previously stated, the FMS program is one of several programs 
administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).  In addition to FMS, 
the DSCA also administers seven other functions: Military Assistance, Foreign Military 
                                                 
13 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Welcome to DSCA,” Overview Presentation, 8 Mar 2005, 
10 May 2007, <http://www.dsca.osd.mil/about_us.htm>.  
14 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director of Administration and Management, Directorate for 
Organizational and Management Planning, “The Department of Defense Organizational Structure,” Mar 
2007, 10 May 2007, <http://www.dod.mil/odam/omp/pubs/GuideBook/DoD.htm#Defense%20Agencies>. 
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Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Excess Defense 
Articles (EDA), Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Mine Action (HDM), 
Drawdowns, and Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Programs.15  These 
functions are managed by directorates divisions as depicted in the DSCA organization 
chart, Figure 4.  The Operations, Programs and Strategy directorates are broken into 
subdivisions based on geographic location, type of program and plans and policies, while 
the other directorates perform support functions. 
b. DSCA Directorates   
Specifically, the Operation Directorate (OPS) provides policy oversight, 
guidance, planning coordination and direction for the execution of security cooperation 
programs; these programs include sale, lease, commercial contracts and drawdown of 
defense articles and services to foreign governments.  The responsibility of the OPS is 
divided into three divisions with overlapping regional areas of responsibility to meet U.S. 
foreign policy and national security interests: 1) Middle East South Asia (MSA) Division 
supports CENTCOM and EUCOM; 2) Europe Africa (EAF) Division supports EUCOM, 
CENTCOM, NORTHCOM and PACOM; and 3) Asia Pacific Americas (APA) Division 
supports PACOM, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM.16 
The Programs Directorate (PMG) is responsible for International Military 
Education and Training, End-use Monitoring, formulation of the President’s Budget for 
Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training, Excess 
Defense Articles, Humanitarian Assistance and Mine Action, and Weapon Systems.  The 
PMG is also broken down into three divisions: 1) Management (MGT) Division oversees 
the International Military Education and Training, End-use Monitoring, and formulation 
of the President’s Budget for Foreign Military Financing and International Training 
Programs; 2) Human Assistance, Disaster Relief and Mine Action (HDM) Division 
                                                 
15 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director of Administration and Management, Directorate for 
Organizational and Management Planning, “The Department of Defense Organizational Structure,” March 
2007,  10 May 2007, <http://www.dod.mil/odam/omp/pubs/GuideBook/DoD.htm#Defense%20Agencies>. 
16 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Operations Directorate,” Mar 2007, 10 May 2007, 
<http://www.dsca.mil/programs/Country_Programs/cntry_programs.htm>. 
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ensures timely disaster relief and effective direction, supervision and oversight of DoD 
Humanitarian mine action and humanitarian assistance programs for the Director of 
DSCA; and 3) Weapons (WPN) Division is accountable for Excess Defense Articles, 
International Trade Shows and Weapons Systems.17  
The Strategy Directorate (STR) is charged with envisioning, developing, 
resourcing, promulgating and assessing Security Assistance and Security cooperation 
policy, programs and activities.  The STR is also divided into three divisions: 1) Plans 
Division conducts assessments, coordinates Security Cooperation Guidance/Strategy, 
coordinates agency efforts supporting the Global War on Terrorism, analyzes national 
strategic documents, and facilitates transformation initiatives; 2) Policy Division serves 
as the DSCA’s lead point of contact for developing, writing, and disseminating security 
assistance/cooperation policy and procedures, including writing and maintaining the 
Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), DoD 5105-38-M, and the reviewing 
of business processes; and 3) Requirement Division is responsible for out-year resource 
planning, sales forecasting coordination, issuing a Planning and Programming guidance 
for the Security Cooperation Community, as well as for performing manpower analysis, 
program analysis and evaluation for the DSCA community. 18   
The other four directorates have no divisions, but rather functional areas.  
First, the Business Operations/Comptroller (DBO) administers the financial aspects of 
foreign purchaser’s programs (including the Foreign Military Financing Program) and 
develops policies and procedures to control financial execution of security cooperation 
within the DoD.19  Second, the Directorate for Information Technology (IT) functions to 
maintain and operate those assigned information systems that support the DSCA and the 
entire security cooperation community, as well as to develop and enhance information 
                                                 
17 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Program Directorate,” Mar 2007, 10 May 2007, 
<http://www.dsca.mil/programs/pgm/index.htm>. 
18 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Strategy Directorate,” Mar 2007, 10 May 2007, < 
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/Program_Support/psd_org.htm>. 
19 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Business Operations/Comptroller Directorate,” Mar 2007, 
10 May 2007, <http://www.dsca.mil/programs/Comptroller/comptroller.htm>. 
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systems to deliver new business value to the security cooperation community.20  Third, 
the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) Directorate provides 
professional education, research and support to advance U.S. foreign policy through 
Security Assistance and Cooperation.21  Lastly, the Defense Institute of International 
Legal Studies (DIILS) Directorate provides expertise in over 350 legal topics of Military 
law, Justice Systems, and the Rule of Law, with an emphasis on the execution of 
Disciplined Military Operations through both resident courses and mobile education 
teams.  Participants from 136 nations have taken part in DIILS Mobile Education, 
Resident and Model Maritime Service Code programs.22 
 
 
Figure 4.   Defense Security Cooperation Agency Organization Chart23 
                                                 
20 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Directorate for Information Technology,” Mar 2007, 10 
May 2007, <http://www.dsca.mil/programs/IT/info_tech_dir.htm>. 
21 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM Mission Statement,” Mar 2007, 10 
May 2007, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/>. 
22 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “Defense Institute of International Legal 
Studies,” Mar 2007, 10 May 2007, <http://www.dsca.mil/diils/>.   
23 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Organization Chart,” Mar 2007, 3 Apr 2007, 
<http://www.dsca.mil/organization.htm>. 
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c.  Key Oversight Departments 
In addition to the directorate management, the DSCA relies on two key 
organizations to help fulfill its mission: 1) Department of State (DOS) and 2) Department 
of Defense (DoD). 
The Department of State is charged with determining which countries 
have programs, reviewing and approving all sales and transfers, issuing munitions export 
licenses (commercial sales), and determining foreign assistance funding levels.  The 
Department of Defense is responsible for determining what equipment is available for 
sale, recommending foreign assistance funding levels, implementing the FMS program, 
implementing grant and credit FMF programs, and implementing military education 
programs. 24   While the Department of Defense is directly responsible for FMS 
implementation, the Department of State designates potential customers and oversees 
sales; each is reliant on the other for program execution. 
4. How FMS Operates  
FMS is primarily managed and operated by the DoD on a no-profit and no-loss 
basis.  Approved program participants purchase defense equipment and services at prices 
that recover the actual costs incurred by the United States. However, to cover 
administration costs, the sale prices include a 2.5% fee and as of October 2006, the 
administrative cost increased to 3.5%.25  The FMS program operates as a no-loss country 
trust fund, which is a U.S. Treasury account credited with receipts, earmarked by law and 
held in a fiduciary capacity by the U.S. government to carry out specific purposes and 
programs.  According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the FMS trust fund 
“represents the aggregation of cash received from purchaser countries and international 
organizations.  The DSCA is responsible for management of the trust fund.  DFAS-DE is 
responsible for accountability of the trust fund.  FMS customer cash deposits for defense 
                                                 
24 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Welcome to DSCA,” Overview Presentation, 8 Mar 2005, 
10 May 2007, <http://www.dsca.osd.mil/about_us.htm>. 
25 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Chapter 9, 
Oct 2006, 10 May 2007, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/greenbook.htm>.  
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articles and services sold under Sections 21 and 22, Arms Export Control Act (AECA), are 
made in advance of delivery or performance and for making progress payments to 
contractors.”26  Figure 5 below traces the movement of cash in and out of the trust fund.   
 
 
Figure 5.   Foreign Military Sales Flow of Funds27 
 
Participating countries initiate a Letter of Request (LOR) through a representative 
to their U.S. counterpart when defense equipment, training or services are needed.  
Copies of the request are then forwarded to the Department of State’s Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs and the DSCA. The original request is given to the Department of 
Defense’s Military Department or other executing Defense Agency as a Letter of Request 
(LOR).  The agency then prepares a response in the form of a Letter of Offer and 
Acceptance (LOA).   The diagram below, Figure 6, depicts the process for request and 
approval of FMS items. 
 
                                                 
26 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Chapter 9, 
Oct 2006, 1 May 2007, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/greenbook.htm>. 
27 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Chapter 9, 
Oct 2006, 1 May 2007, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/greenbook.htm>. 
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Figure 6.   Foreign Military Sales Customer Purchasing Process28 
 
LOAs take three forms: Defined Line, Blanket Order and Cooperative Logistics 
Supply Support Arrangements.  First, Defined Line agreements offer items at 
individually estimated prices and delivery dates.  Only certain defense equipment, 
training and services can be provided through Defined Line LOAs.  Sequentially, the U.S. 
Government contracts for the required items to fulfill the LOA.  As outlined in DISAM 
guidance, “the types of defense articles, services, or training normally processed as 
defined-order cases include: 
• SME. This includes major end-items and weapon systems (e.g., tanks, 
ships, airplanes, missiles, etc.), and any related requirements to activate 
and operate an item or system during an initial period of time. 
• Explosives including munitions 
• Specific services (i.e., transportation, aircraft ferrying.) 
• Technical data packages”29 
Second, Blanket Orders LOAs are suited for handling recurring needs, items 
required on a frequent or periodic basis. Once established, the Blanket Order LOA 
                                                 
28 “Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Chapter 5, 
Oct 2006, 21 Apr 2007, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/05%20Chapter.pdf>. 
29 “Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Chapter 6, 
Apr 2007, 1 May 2007, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/05%20Chapter.pdf>. 
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decreases the time needed for order processing and contracting for required items and/or 
services.  The Blanket Orders cover the following types of items: 
• Spare and repair parts 
• Publications 
• Support Equipment 
• Maintenance 
• Technical Assistance Services 
• Training 
• Training Aid Devices30 
Third, a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement (CLSSA) allows 
customers access to the U.S. logistics pipeline for the support of specified end items. 
With CLSSA agreements, customers use existing U.S. stocks to supply repair parts and 
avoid waiting for completion of a procurement cycle. CLSSAs are usually established for 
countries with well-developed logistics systems which are, therefore utilizing larger 
quantities of end items.31   
The FMS process is essentially an acquisition process.32  Figure 7 below depicts 
how and where the FMS program fits into the DoD 5000 Acquisition Process.  It is 
important to note where in the acquisition life cycle FMS is incorporated in order to 
understand how procurement of FMS items and U.S. State Department policies are 
incorporated.  As represented in Figure 7, FMS programs are for currently deployed 
systems that are in the Full Rate Production level as opposed to those in the 
developmental stages of the acquisition lifecycle.   
 
                                                 
30 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Chapter 6, 
Apr 2007, 1 May 2007, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/06%20Chapter.pdf >. 
31 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “How Does FMS Operate,” Frequently Asked Questions, 3 
Apr 2007, <http://www.dsca.osd.mil/PressReleases/faq.htm#How%20Does%20FMS%20Operate>. 
32 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Chapter 9, 
Oct 2006, 10 May 2007, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/greenbook.htm>. 
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Figure 7.   Foreign Military Sales and the Department of Defense Acquisition 
Process33 
 
5. Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) versus Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
Foreign countries have two differing contract options of procuring systems from 
the U.S., Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS).  Direct 
Commercial Sales (DCS) are sales of military equipment, services or training through 
civilian/commercial or non-governmental companies, as opposed to sale through the 
Department of Defense.  According to the DSCA, “DCS allows the foreign customer 
more direct involvement during contract negotiation, may allow firm-fixed pricing and 
may be better suited to fulfilling non-standard requirements.”34   
However, with the FMS program, the DoD uses the same acquisition process for 
procuring their own goods as it does for foreign customers.  Using this process helps to 
ensure standardization with U.S. forces, decrease unit costs through economies of scale, 
and provide contract administration services where they may not be available in the 
                                                 
33 “Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Chapter 9, 
Oct 2006, 21 Apr 2007, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/09%20Chapter.pdf>. 
34 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “The FMS Advantage: Frequently Asked Questions About 
Foreign Military Sales,” Full Color Brochure, 21 Jan 2004, 10 May 2007 
<http://www.dsca.osd.mil/about_us.htm>. 
  22
private sector.  Recently Federal Acquisition Regulations have opened the door to allow 
foreign governments the opportunity to partake in FMS contract negotiations as 
appropriate.35 
In differentiating the two, it is imperative to know that some items are not 
available for DCS due to technology transfer and other restricting factors, and that it is 
solely the procuring countries decision on which program they choose.  The Security 
Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) outlines the process for designating items that 
are restricted to FMS only.  The major differences between DCS and FMS are that with 
FMS, the customer is entering into a direct Government-to-Government agreement, 
whereas with DCS, the customer is dealing directly with industry.  Under the Arms 
Export Control Act, both sales must be approved by the U.S. Government and have 
congressional approval for any FMS of DCS item valued at $14 Million or more.  Below, 
Figure 8 delineates the major difference in the process between DCS and FMS.  
Specifically it depicts the flow of documentation from the customer country to the U.S. 
contractor and/or government. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales Process Flow36 
                                                 
35 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “The FMS Advantage: Frequently Asked Questions About 




The FMS program is comprised of both strengths and weaknesses; thus, the 
program incites some concern.  Purchases by the U.S Government are made in 
accordance with well-established DoD Regulations and policies, and foreign 
governments under the FMS program are afforded these same guidelines and procedures 
throughout their procurement processes.  Under the FMS program, proper market 
research and price and cost analysis are conducted to determine if the price is fair and 
reasonable and to ensure the contract is awarded based on lowest feasible price from 
qualified sources under the most efficient contract type. According to the Defense 
Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), DoD orders are often 
consolidated to obtain economy of scale buys and, therefore, significantly lower unit 
costs.  One key aspect of the FMS program is the extent of oversight given to these 
contracts.  Audits and other oversight regulations outlined in the Truth In Negotiation Act 
(TINA), the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and other governing regulations and 
acts apply to all FMS procurements. At the same time, FMS sales do not require export 
licenses, and FMS transactions have mandatory financial management reviews and must 
meet Cost and Accounting Standard guides.  Below is a list of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the FMS Program as viewed by DISAM: 
a. Advantages of FMS 
• Purchaser pays actual U.S. Government Costs 
• Direct interaction between military personnel who operate the 
weapon system with receiving countries; military personnel who 
will use the system (value added to the customer) 
• Contract administration; under FMS, contract quality assurance, 
inspection and audit services are routinely provided and are 
included in FMS costs. 
                                                                                                                                                 
36 “Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Chapter 9, 
Oct 2006, 21 Apr 2007, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/09%20Chapter.pdf>. 
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• Initial cash flow requirements required at LOA are generally lower 
than commercial contract down-payments 
• FMS can provide customers with unique DoD training, 
technology and equipment that contractor support cannot access. 
• Procuring country pays only the actual costs to DoD with profits 
controlled by the FAR 
• Items may be available from DoD stock in times of emergency 
• Allows better access to training at U.S. military schools 
• FMS does not require export licenses 
b. Disadvantages of FMS 
• Government-to-Government agreement: Political climate may 
discourage procuring from the U.S. Government 
• Less flexibility in the contract package deals: Customer may not 
want other items being offered for sale 
• Under the LOA the U.S. Government reserves the right to 
terminate an FMS LOA and/or halt the actual export deliveries of 
FMS items when it is determined to be in the national interest of 
the U.S. 
• Defense articles that are in production can be procured more 
quickly via commercial channels than through the FMS system 
• The contracting of Direct Commercial Sales or a good or service 
may be more flexible than FMS since U.S. Industry has no 
structure or regulatory guidance such as the FAR; and the flexible 
arrangement may be better for the customer under DCS 
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• The FMS system provides for estimated prices and payment 
schedules, which mean the final price (including the delivery 
schedule, etc.) may be higher than the initial estimated price  
• FMS charges Non-recurring costs to customers, where DCS is 
exempt from charges 
• DCS provides more capability to tailor packages to unique country 
needs 
• DCS provides new equipment directly from the production line37 
Table 2 directly compares the positive and negative elements in both the 
Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales programs.  In summary, Foreign 
Military Sales are intended for countries wishing to contract directly with the U.S. 
government, thus avoiding export licenses requirements and enhancing access to 
equipment training.  On the other hand Direct Commercial Sales are best suited for 
countries wishing to contract directly with U.S. suppliers for a faster and more robust 
means for acquiring defense related articles.  Note that both approaches have both 











Table 2.   Comparison of Foreign Military Sales  Direct Commercial Sales 
(Positive/Negative Elements)38 




• Gov’t-to-Gov’t  
• Access to Training 
• Pays actual USG costs 
• No Export License required 
• Package deals 
 
• Lacks flexibility in package 
deals 
• Complex 
• Non-recurring costs 
• Estimated Pricing 
• Slower 





• No Federal acquisition 
Surcharge 
• Simple 
• Quicker acquisition 
 
• Requires Export License 
• Down payment more expensive 
• No package deals 
 
B. HISTORY OF FMS PROGRAM 
1. Program Initiation and Development 
The use of Foreign Military Sales can be traced back as far as Thucydides’ history 
of the Peloponnesian War over 2500 years ago; the supply and demand for weapons 
transfer continues to be a national goal in maintaining national security.39   Foreign 
Military Sales have come in the form of arms, munitions, goods, services, and many other 
forms provided on loan, as grants, or bought outright by foreign countries in need of 
security assistance.  The first example of the use of FMS and security assistance with 
respect to the United States of America came from France in the form of arms and 
munitions during the War for Independence in an effort to help the US defeat the British.  
The assistance came not just in the form of munitions and arms, but also to garner 
                                                                                                                                                 
37 “Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Chapter 
15, Oct 2006, 21 Apr 2007, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/15%20Chapter.pdf>. 
38 “Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Chapter 
15, Oct 2006, 21 Apr 2007, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/15%20Chapter.pdf>. 
39 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Appendix 
2 History of Security Assistance, Oct 2006, 21 Apr 2007, 
<http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/20%20Appendix%202.pdf>. 
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relations and policy between the French and the Americans.  The Nineteenth century 
period after the War for Independence saw the first policy to establish security assistance 
in the form of the Monroe Doctrine.  Ever since the culmination of the doctrine, 
Presidents from McKinley to Kennedy and Clinton have all used some form of Security 
assistance for national security and for foreign relations. 40 
2. World War Era  
In World War I, the U.S. emerged as the leading participant in the international 
munitions trade, exporting approximately $2.2 Billion in war supplies to Europe between 
1914 and 1917.  This included over $1 Billion of arms alone in 1914; by 1920, the U.S. 
was responsible for more than 52% of the global arms exports.  In 1930, the first special 
Senate Munitions Investigating Committee, or Nye Committee, was assigned to 
determine whether the arms trade could be regulated under current laws and treaties.  The 
result of the Committee’s review produced a munitions control board for oversight over 
the U.S. arms industry. 
World War II saw the same effect and influence of arms trade and was 
highlighted by the Lend-Lease Program to aid the British in 1941.  In the Lend-Lease 
Program, the U.S. loaned materials and services to the allies in return for payment upon 
completion of the war.  The amount later repaid to the U.S was less than one fifth of the 
loaned amount.41  Following the conclusion of WWII, the rise of the bi-polar super 
powers emerged, and President Truman felt that the spread of “Soviet Hegemony was 
inimical to the national interests of the U.S.”  Thus the declaration of the Truman 
Doctrine resulted in over $400 million dollars of aid to Greece and Turkey alone in 1947. 
Truman declared to Congress on 12 March 1947: 
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by 
                                                 
40 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Appendix 
2 History of Security Assistance, Oct 2006, 21 Apr 2007, 
<http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/20%20Appendix%202.pdf>. 
41 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “DISAM”S Online Green Book,” Appendix 
2 - History of Security Assistance, Oct 2006, 21 Apr 2007, 
<http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/20%20Appendix%202.pdf>. 
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outside pressure. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out 
their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be 
primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to 
economic stability and orderly political processes. In addition to funds, I 
ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military 
personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist 
in the tasks of reconstruction and for the purpose of supervising the use of 
such financial and material assistance as may be furnished, I recommend 
that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected 
Greek and Turkish personnel… 42 
These arms transfers were made to participants in an emerging network of U.S. 
alliances, and were provided as grants, under what became known as the military 
assistance program (MAP).43  
3.  Cold War Era 
In 1948, Congress established the European Recovery Plan (ERP), which 
provided loans and grants for arms and defense-related articles in the amount of $15 
Billion to sixteen nations of Western Europe between 1948 and 1952. Until 1965, NATO 
countries received approximately 56% of all arms transferred through foreign military 
sales; however, in the mid 1950’s, as the stock pile of WWII material declined, the U.S. 
began offering technical assistance and industrial equipment to help expand European 
defense production. With several incidents in the 1950’s, including the Korean War in 
1950, Egyptian initiatives to acquire Soviet arms in 1955, and the increasing involvement 
of the U.S. in Indochina in the late 1950’s, the Eisenhower Doctrine was initiated on 
March 9, 1957. This Doctrine asserted the “right of the U.S. to assist any nation or group 
of nations […] from any country controlled by international communism.” U.S. 
assistance was now outlined to be based upon a request from any endangered country; 
however, the doctrine was to be evoked only in the event of external, communists armed 
aggression, and was not to be applied in response to an internal insurrection or civil war.  
                                                 
42 Truman Presidential Museum and Library, “Student Activity Harry Truman and the Truman 
Doctrine,” Mar 1990, 8 May 2007, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/teacher/doctrine.htm>. 
43 U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 
1995,” Oct 1995, 3 May 2007, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/reports1.htm>. 
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President Kennedy initiated other aid and diplomatic actions and the Nixon 
Doctrine incorporated new guidelines for American Foreign Policy, initially termed the 
Guam doctrine, which focused more attention on the role of U.S. as a partnership with 
foreign countries than a dictatorial role. At this same time, new legislation was passed 
through Congress to institute more efficient security assistance management procedures 
and greater control over the future transfer of arms. The International Security Assistance 
and Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 prohibited arms transfers to any nation 
found to be in systematic violation of human rights and established closer oversight of 
arms transfer by Congress.  
On July 8, 1981, however, President Reagan announced a new conventional arms 
transfer policy which viewed arms transfers as an essential element of our global defense 
policy and an indispensable component of U.S. foreign policy. Reagan’s approach, which 
differed considerably from the Carter Administration’s view of arms transfers as an 
“exceptional foreign policy implement.” identified arms transfers to America’s major 
alliance partners as its first priority—ensuring that the policy remain flexible and robust 
to respond quickly to changing conditions and shifting Soviet strategies.44  
4. Post-Cold War to Present 
The results of the monumental fall of the Berlin Wall resulted in the flow of large 
supplies of cheap excess defense articles being made available for transfer. Also, due to 
the downsizing, cutbacks and cancellations in Department of Defense weapons 
acquisitions, legal provisions were made for broader eligibility and simpler 
implementation. This reduction in system development and production caused U.S. 
industry to look to overseas markets; many organizations requested the assistance of 
various U.S. government officials and their agencies in entering the foreign marketplace. 
President Clinton’s Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, reiterated a previous policy 
encouraging U.S. embassies to actively assist U.S. marketing efforts overseas. This was 
interpreted to include aiding U.S. defense contractors in the pursuit of direct commercial 
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sales and foreign military sales of defense articles, services, and training overseas.  In 
1993, FMS sales topped $33 Billion due primarily to major defense equipment sales to 
countries in the Arabian Gulf area and Taiwan. This new policy did not represent a 
dramatic change from previous policy; rather, it was introduced “as a summation and 
codification” of the Clinton Administration’s “decision-making in the arms transfer 
arena...” Clinton’s policy goals were to ensure assistance was available to help allies and 
friends prepare themselves against aggression, to remain interoperable with U.S. military 
forces, to promote regional stability in areas of U.S. interests and to support the U.S 
industrial base—ensuring technological superiority; and to lower unit costs for U.S. 
military procurement.  The results following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
and the initiation of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues and will continue to 
promote FMS and security assistance in the forms of arms, munitions, and other goods 
and services.45 The following two graphs illustrate the dynamics of the global arms
transfers trends over the past 25 years. 
Figure 9 compares arms transfer dollar amounts of the world’s two biggest arms 
suppliers, US and Russia, for the period of 1980 to 2005.  Figures for Russia until 1991 
include arms transfer amounts from other Union of Soviet Socialist Republics countries, 
such as Ukraine and Belarus.  As seen in the graph, the USSR dominated the world arms 
market until its collapse in 1991.  The U.S. then became the global leader in arms 
transfers, peaking in 1998. For the next four years the U.S. saw a gradual decrease in
sales allowed Russia to regain the lead until losing its position as the number one weapons 
supplier in the world in 2004. 
Figure 10 compares the total dollar amounts of the U.S. and the rest of the world’s 
arms transfers over the period of 1980 to 2005.  From 1991-1996, the U.S. accounted for  
                                                                                                                                                 
44 United States, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for (1984), 
Report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, and the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984). 
45 Richard R. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Developing Nations, 1996-2003, 
Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2004).  
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more arms transfers in dollars than all the other countries in the world combined.  
Interestingly, when US exports started to decline in 1999, its global arms transfer 




Figure 9.   U.S. and USSR (Russia from 1991) Arms Transfers46 
                                                 
46 Stockholm International Research Institute, “The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database – Access,” Oct 2006, 5 May 2007, 
<http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/access.html#twenty>. 
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Figure 10.   Arms Transfers Trend Comparison of the U.S. to the Rest of the World 47 
                                                 
47 Stockholm International Research Institute, “The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database – Access,” Oct 2006, 5 May 2007, 
<http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/access.html#twenty>. 
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C. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ISSUES AND CONCERNS 
Issues and concerns have been identified throughout the FMS timeline and this 
section will outline some of the major concerns from the Cold War to the present Global 
War on Terrorism.   
Since the passing of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, one of the first major 
areas of concern arose from the Defense Department’s failure to recover costs. For 
example, a GAO study in 1979 identified an estimated $370 Million of unrecovered costs 
during six fiscal years on items sold to foreign governments.  Furthermore, the study 
argued that since 1970, defense pricing instructions required that the items being sold to 
foreign countries be priced to recover full contract costs and that proper quality assurance 
services be put in place to meet these requirements.48 
In 1976, another GAO study identified that many members of Congress were 
concerned that the rapid growth of U.S. arms transfers abroad was taking place without 
adequate consideration of  the potentially destabilizing effects of such transfers. Some of 
the expressed concerns were the potential effects on the stimulation of regional arms 
races, encouragement of certain countries' tendencies to place too much emphasis on 
military considerations at the expense of social-humanitarian concerns, and identification 
of the United States with regimes which, for one reason or another, appear to adopt 
extreme repressive practices.  
Another area of concern surfaced in 1999 with the delicate sensitivity of FMS 
with regard to foreign policy of the United States.  An example of this was outlined in 
“Country Briefing: Saudi Arabia,” which quoted Officials in Saudi Arabia as saying “that 
the kingdom may look elsewhere for a replacement for the F-5 if the USA continues to 
link future military sales to Israeli security concerns.”49 Clearly there is a sensitivity 
pertaining to providing FMS to countries who are allies of the U.S. but who may have 
policy issues with each other.  
                                                 
48United States, Government Accountability Office, “Improperly Subsidizing Foreign Military Sales 
Program; A Continuing Problem, FGMSD-79-16.” (Washington D.C.: GAO, 1979).  
49 “Country Briefing: Saudi Arabia,” Jane's Defense Weekly 18 Aug 1999: 30. 
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In 1999, a FMS Financial Audit for the Deputy Secretary of Defense was 
conducted which identified a number of FMS management inaccuracies or delayed 
financial management transactions.  The review produced a number of recommendations 
with the potential to improve financial management in the near-term.50  
A GAO (GAO-03-939R) study from 2003, reported control of spare parts 
containing sensitive military technology being released to foreign countries. 51  Another 
GAO study found that the Air Force did not currently have any internal controls in place 
to prevent the release of spare parts containing sensitive military technology.52  The 
report identified examples such as in 1997, when a requisition for a C-130 refueling kit, 
which was to be used on U.S. aircraft only, was not reviewed by anyone and was 
transferred to a foreign country because there were no controls in place to require that it 
be reviewed.  The GAO reported that the Security Assistance Management Manual 
indicates that the transfer of technology is to be restricted, however it does not define a 
process or established criteria for such restrictions. 
Further issues with controls in place to review technology transfer and restrictive 
spares to foreign countries were also examined in 2004 by the GAO (GAO-04-327, 2004 
April 15).  The GAO found that the Army’s internal controls over foreign military sales 
were not adequate and placed classified spare parts and unclassified items containing 
military technology at risk of being shipped to foreign countries. Of 40 random 
requisitions reviewed by the GAO, three of them between 1997 and 2003 had released 
classified parts to foreign countries.   
                                                 
50 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Financial Management, 13 
Dec 1999, 4 May 2007, <http://www.dsca.osd.mil/DSCA_memoranda/DSCA%20_00-
19/Hamre_Dec_99_memo.pdf>. 
51 United States, Government Accountability Office, “Foreign Military Sales; Improved Air Force 
Controls Could Prevent Unauthorized Shipments of Classified and Controlled Spare Parts to Foreign 
Countries, GAO-03-664,” (Washington D.C.: GAO, 2003). 
52 United States, Government Accountability Office, “Foreign Military Sales; Air Force Does Not Use 
Controls to Prevent Spare Parts Containing Sensitive Military Technology from Being Released to Foreign 
Countries, GAO-03-939R,” (Washington D.C.: GAO, 2003). 
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In 2000, a GAO study was conducted on FMS and the changes needed to correct 
weaknesses in the end-use monitoring program. 53   The study concluded that the 
Department of Defense had not effectively implemented the requirement that its field 
personnel observe and report on foreign governments’ use of U.S. defense articles and 
services transferred through the Foreign Military Sales program. Because the extent of 
observation needed to verify that defense articles and services are being used 
appropriately will vary from country to country, the Department had not issued guidance 
specifying what monitoring is required. As a result, field personnel interpret the 
requirements and the activities that they should perform differently. Field personnel in 40 
of the 68 countries they surveyed reported that they did not carry out this requirement due 
to insufficient resources.54  
In addition, Congressional concerns include accusations against congress for 
turning a blind eye to illegal use of export weapons against civilians.  Sometimes the sale 
of weapon systems are in the best interest of the foreign customers country, however, are 
not necessarily in the best interest of the U.S.  For example, in 1998, Raytheon sold 
to Israel through foreign military sales more than 200 AIM-120 Advanced Medium 
Range Air-to-Air Missiles for more than $100 Million, 14 Beech King B200 fixed-wing 
aircraft for $125 Million, and a Patriot missile system for $73 Million, according to the 
Federation of American Scientists. Unfortunately, Israel has used U.S.-provided weapons 
on several occasions to kill Palestinian civilians. One example of this happened in July 
2002 when U.S.-made F-16s destroyed an apartment building in Gaza City, killing 17 
Palestinians civilians in what Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon termed "a great 
success." White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer acknowledge that it was "a deliberate 
attack against a building in which civilians were known to be located." However, to 
admit that Israel is in violation of the law would jeopardize future U.S. arms exports to 
                                                 
53 United States, Government Accountability Office, “Foreign Military Sales; Changes Needed to 
Correct Weaknesses in End-Use Monitoring Program, GAO/NSIAD-00-208,” (Washington D.C.: GAO, 
2000). 
54 United States, Government Accountability Office, “Foreign Military Sales; Changes Needed to 




Israel and present the defense industry with a nightmarish scenario in which their $2 
Billion yearly subsidy would dry up.55 
Issues have also raised congressional attention in the past few years; in June of 
2005, Senator Daniel K. Akaka (D-HI) called on the federal government to help Hawaii 
and other states collect unpaid taxes from federal contractors owing state taxes.  In his
opening statement to the permanent subcommittee on investigations, Sen.
Akaka, along with Sen. Carl Levins, requested that the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) review the amount owed by federal contractors for unpaid taxes.
The GAO Study found that 33,000 federal contractors owe $3 Billion to the U.S. 
government.56 The outcome of this investigation is still ongoing.  
In this chapter we have introduced the Foreign Military Sales program along with 
the history and organizational structure.  We have also reviewed the history of FMS and 
some of the issues and concerns that have been addressed from industry and 
congressional officials and the differences between contracts for FMS and DCS. In the 
next chapter, explores analytical concepts to describe FMS and the possible trends that 




                                                 
55 Joshua Ruebner, “Ratheon-Israel-Congress,” CounterPunch, 11 Feb 2003, 10 May 2007, 
<http://www.counterpunch.org/ruebner02112003.html>.  
56 Daniel Kkahikina Akaka, U.S. Senator for Hawaii, “Newsroom,”15 June 2005, 7 May 2007, 
<http://akaka.senate.gov/public/index.cfm>. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF FMS FACTORS AND TRENDS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Foreign Military Sales have helped the U.S. achieve its foreign policy goals as well 
as support its allies.  In this chapter, we explore some analytical concepts to identify 
factors affecting FMS.  The research is divided into three major areas of trend analysis.  
The objective of the analysis is to determine whether any apparent trends were evident in 
Socio-Political, Economic, or Industrial and Technological arenas.  
B. SOCIO-POLITICAL TRENDS 
In assessing the correlation with FMS and the threat condition of the US and its 
allies, this research defined the foreign threat to the U.S National Interests abroad at four 
major milestones: 1) The Cold War Era (WWII-1989), 2) First Gulf War (1991-1993), 3) 
Peace Keeping operations (1993-2001), and  4) the Global War on Terrorism (2001-
present).  The researchers examined both the total Foreign Military Sales agreements and 
Foreign Military Sales delivered by five specified regions stretching from 1980 until 
2005 and analyzed each region based upon the entire FMS budget. The regions are 
specified accordingly to the prescribed reporting done by the DCSA and are as follows:  
1) Western Hemisphere with Canada FMS 2) Africa FMS, 3) Europe FMS, 4) Near East 
and South Asia FMS, 5) East Asia and Pacific FMS.  Based on this information, the 
graphs below, Figures 11 and 12, identify which regions were given what amount of the 
FMS budget. The research then examined what “Hot Spots” or areas of U.S. National 
Interests correlated with the regional FMS agreements and deliveries respectively to 










East Asia and 
Pacific 
Agreements
East Asia and 
Pacific 
Deliveries 
Near East and 
South Asia 
Agreements 





$879,631 $403,766 $24,009,453 $11,103,982 1980 $3,803,554 $2,061,910 $11,362,205 $4,533,620 $8,354,956
$540,387 $652,096 $11,250,129 $13,299,005 1981 $3,116,881 $3,273,249 $3,397,704 $5,425,968 $3,796,377
$851,303 $627,232 $26,650,681 $14,224,485 1982 $7,680,633 $2,063,411 $14,348,821 $7,216,961 $3,082,087
$1,066,291 $600,792 $22,118,531 $16,409,753 1983 $3,146,590 $2,649,966 $7,595,602 $8,953,608 $10,868,631
$1,049,125 $444,645 $18,418,682 $12,198,697 1984 $2,293,038 $2,255,484 $5,857,843 $5,319,752 $9,274,694
$992,857 $486,534 $14,818,844 $10,823,069 1985 $3,422,477 $2,428,969 $5,213,483 $4,524,325 $5,068,535
$709,829 $341,454 $8,499,428 $10,081,806 1986 $2,482,284 $2,026,676 $2,522,739 $4,712,204 $2,708,842
$689,929 $487,798 $8,081,990 $14,327,624 1987 $2,364,623 $2,507,685 $2,462,419 $7,715,017 $2,473,511
$660,809 $666,897 $14,282,330 $11,564,494 1988 $2,899,374 $3,355,293 $8,919,314 $3,428,078 $1,705,229
$663,661 $500,582 $11,173,461 $9,152,303 1989 $1,934,338 $2,596,272 $6,646,103 $2,045,571 $1,847,629
$611,951 $556,284 $20,322,236 $9,423,947 1990 $3,623,384 $2,344,593 $13,339,189 $3,046,272 $2,830,896
$555,437 $643,286 $19,687,861 $10,232,346 1991 $2,543,960 $2,201,903 $13,044,215 $4,682,919 $2,546,882
$545,207 $811,592 $14,306,391 $11,490,781 1992 $4,214,243 $2,288,184 $2,839,030 $6,070,927 $5,635,484
$6,124,006 $905,182 $31,680,516 $12,452,286 1993 $8,774,589 $2,266,571 $15,557,791 $7,235,139 $6,243,521
$389,728 $920,014 $13,679,905 $10,661,243 1994 $3,435,789 $2,933,123 $5,019,966 $3,929,727 $4,387,257
$470,998 $1,423,558 $9,079,234 $12,931,370 1995 $2,160,613 $3,507,204 $2,429,383 $6,809,958 $3,640,661
$991,137 $868,990 $9,412,086 $12,314,342 1996 $3,084,757 $2,770,952 $3,923,641 $5,702,162 $2,118,544
$1,170,681 $2,438,148 $8,408,943 $16,294,591 1997 $2,953,992 $4,170,700 $2,098,991 $7,821,097 $2,950,407
$1,334,927 $1,451,036 $8,689,600 $14,040,551 1998 $2,383,795 $3,497,212 $4,300,374 $6,708,508 $1,700,299
$1,165,140 $2,512,709 $11,201,155 $16,927,384 1999 $3,086,048 $4,618,899 $5,316,994 $6,692,908 $2,572,023
$717,531 $783,767 $10,820,154 $10,671,734 2000 $2,515,240 $3,662,365 $3,676,507 $4,050,694 $4,134,308
$1,094,775 $1,139,135 $12,456,912 $12,059,194 2001 $3,056,658 $3,118,773 $5,649,053 $4,413,252 $3,508,357
$715,809 $1,374,172 $11,839,264 $10,168,512 2002 $3,887,824 $3,205,224 $4,864,676 $4,103,849 $2,263,215
$1,394,999 $625,342 $12,202,560 $8,899,950 2003 $3,267,992 $2,117,120 $2,991,183 $3,077,246 $5,521,042
$2,117,314 $862,800 $12,388,689 $10,219,646 2004 $3,783,820 $2,479,780 $5,570,821 $3,959,841 $2,654,600
 






                                                 
57 FMS figures are drawn from The Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency annual facts books at the Federation of American Scientists website, 






Figure 12.   Foreign Military Sales Deliveries Distributed by Region58 
                                                 
58 FMS figures are drawn from The Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency annual facts books at the Federation of American Scientists website, 
20 Feb 2007, 28 Apr 2007 < http://www.fas.org/main/home.jsp >. 
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As depicted in the graphs above, Figures 11 and 12, the areas receiving the 
highest total amount of the FMS budget are the regions which posed the highest threat to 
the security of the US and their allies and are reflective of the administration’s National 
Security Strategy and foreign policy doctrine at the time.  During the early 1980s, the 
region with the highest dollar amount of FMS agreements proved to be Near East and 
South Asia, as the US doctrine under the Reagan Administration focused on containment 
of communism and the support to bordering or buffer states such as Iran and 
Afghanistan.59 Reagan said, "the U.S. must rebuild the credibility of its commitment to 
resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and those of its Allies and friends, and to 
support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or 
oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet 
policy."60  
However, as the Berlin Wall fell, and with the downfall of the Soviet Union, the 
major region receiving the highest amount of FMS agreements shifted to the European 
countries and the new found freedoms of many formerly soviet socialist republics. After 
this timeframe, the US adopted a two-major-regional-conflict (MRC) strategy for 
foreign and military policy.61  Shortly thereafter, the highest amount of FMS agreements 
reverted to the Near East and South Asia regions with the invasion of Kuwait and the 
major support both in FMS and in military troop presence for Saudi Arabia.  During the 
same period, President Clinton’s National Security Strategy focused both on the 
perceived threats of North Korea, Iran and Iraq as well as on the Middle East peace 
process with the Jewish State of Israel and their Muslim neighbors.62  During all of the  
                                                 
59 Mark P. Lagon, The Reagan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold War’s Last 
Chapter (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994). 
60 NSC National Security Decision Directive 75, “U.S. Relations with the U.S.S.R.,” 1983, 11 May 
2007, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-075.htm>. 
61 United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency Fiscal Year Series, 
(Washington: DoD, 1993) 10-11. 
62 United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency Fiscal Year Series, 
(Washington: DoD, 1993) 10-11. 
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milestones, it is important to note that the majority of FMS agreements to East Asia and 
the Pacific continued to see major funding to Taiwan and the policy of containment from 
the threat of China and communism.   
From 2001 until 2005, the graph depicts the funding for FMS during the new 
Global War on Terrorism.  As evident with the location of military forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the majority of funding for FMS continues to be the Near East and South 
Asia region and will likely continue until the threat of terrorism from this region is no 
longer an issue. 
Based on this analysis, the research for this project concludes that FMS is offered  
to areas which are deemed a security threat to the interests of the U.S. and/or its Allies.  
Through this analysis, the research shows an obvious relationship between the U.S. 
National Security Strategy and the distribution of FMS.  Based on this research, it is 
highly likely that the amount of FMS agreements in the future will continue to be 
provided to areas of concern that are deemed “Hot Spots” by the United States.  As a 
result, the Near East and South Asia region will likely continue to receive higher amounts 
of FMS agreements throughout the Global War on Terrorism. Taiwan will likely continue 
to see a steady state of FMS agreements due to the uncertainty of China relations. Japan 
and Korea will likely see changes in the size of their FMS agreements as the threat from 
North Korea fluctuates. 
C. ECOMONIC TRENDS 
1. Evaluated Areas 
The project team investigated the possible US economic factors that might be 
related to and possibly influence the total dollar amount of annual FMS spending by 
foreign countries. The team identified five US budget line-items that could have 
association with the FMS spending: US Defense Outlays, Military Personnel, Operations 
and Maintenance (O&M), Procurement and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
(RDT&E). Annual US federal budget figures for the period of 1980 to 2005 were 
compared to the respective annual size of FMS agreements to determine whether there is 
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association between the fluctuations in the US Defense budget figures and the size of the 
FMS agreements.  Due to the long-term nature of FMS contracts and complicated 
delivery schedules, the relationship between the US Defense budget and FMS delivery 
figures was not analyzed.  All data used was normalized to Budget Year 2000 dollars for 
comparison purposes.  Appendix A contains the actual data tables, derivations and 
sources.     
2.  Outlays  
Total Annual US Defense Outlay data were analyzed to see if it is correlated with 
the annual FMS agreements figures.  First, both analyzed data series for the period of 
1980 to 2005 were graphically represented on the same chart in Figure 13 to observe 
possible patterns. 
Both data series are in millions of Budget Year 2000 dollars, but FMS agreement 
data was multiplied by a factor of 10 for easier visual comparison, as depicted in Figure 
13, fluctuations in the US Defense Outlays (solid line) have been much less volatile than 
the FMS spending (dashed line).  The graph shows how the size of the outlays fluctuated 
according to the major historical milestones such as the Reagan military build-up in the 
1980s, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the first Gulf War and especially the impact of the new 
Global War on Terrorism since 2001.  Visually, despite a possible inverse relationship 
from 1982 to 1987, where FMS spending was shrinking while at the same time the US 
defense budget was growing, the FMS spending line shows little correlation with the US 
defense budget.  A surge in FMS spending in 1993, attributable solely to Saudi Arabian 
FMS agreements due to the Gulf War is not mirrored by the respective period in the US 
defense budget.  Also, the FMS spending remained anemic to a dramatic increase in US 
defense spending due to the GWOT from 2002 to 2005.   
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
US Defense Outlays (BY 2000$M) Total FMS Agreements Multiplied by 10 (BY 2000$M)
 
Figure 13.   Comparison of US Defense Outlays to Total FMS Agreements 
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Additional possibility of FMS spending having a one or two year lag behind the 
US defense spending was investigated – as U.S. spending changes for the year X, other 
countries follow with associated FMS spending in year X+1.  However, moving the total 
FMS spending line horizontally by one or two years behind the US defense outlays line 
did not produce a better visual fit of the two lines.   
To further examine the possible correlation between the US Defense Outlays and 
Total FMS Agreements, a linear regression of the two variables was performed.  The 
regression equation defines the linear relationship found by the model between the 
dependent (FMS agreements) and independent (US Defense Outlays) variable.  As 
illustrated in Table 3, the model found a regression equation with the intercept of 
22915829 and a negative slope of 30, which indicates a negative correlation between the 
two variables.  In other words, the model found that an increase in US Defense Outlays 
results in a decrease in the FMS agreements.  However, the coefficient of determination 
R-squared (represents the proportion of variation in the data explained by the model) is 
very low at 14.1%.  Therefore, it can be summarized that the model has a slight negative 
correlation, but it explains only 14.1% of total FMS variation, is not credible and should 
not be used to draw any further conclusions about the relationship between the two 
variables. 
 
Table 3.   Regression Statistics for US Defense Outlays and Total FMS Agreements 




US Defense Outlays (BY 
2000$M)
22915829 -30 * US Defense 
Outlays (BY 2000$M)
0.1410
Regression Goodness of Fit Statistics
 
 
3.  US Defense Budget Line-items 
The research examined four separate U.S. defense budget line-items: military 
personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement and research, development, testing 
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and evaluation—to see if these items separately provided better correlation with the total 
FMS spending than the total US Defense Outlays.   
a. Personnel 
In order to see if there is a visual relationship between the total FMS 
spending and the fluctuations in the annual US spending on military personnel for the 
period of 1980 to 2005, both data series were graphically represented in Figure 14.   
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Military Personnel BY 2000$M Total FMS Agreements Multiplied by 10 BY 2000$M
 
Figure 14.   Comparison of US Military Personnel and Total FMS Agreements 
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Data series for U.S. Military Personnel and Total FMS agreements are in 
millions of Budget Year 2000 dollars, but FMS agreement data was multiplied by a factor 
of 10 for easier visual comparison.  As depicted in Figure 14, the pattern of US spending 
on military personnel closely resembles the pattern of the total US spending on defense, 
already covered in the previous section.  It can be noted that for the period from 1995 to 
2005, U.S. spending on military personnel and FMS spending lines have a similar pattern 
of behavior and a better visual fit.  A linear regression of the two variables was 
performed to further examine the possible correlations between the US Military 
Personnel spending (independent variable) and Total FMS agreements (dependent 
variable).  As illustrated in Table 4, the regression equation for the model with military 
personnel spending indicates a negative relation between the US spending on military 
personnel and FMS spending.  The model is very weak as it explains only 9.6% of total 
variation in the FMS agreements data.  No further conclusions can be drawn from this 
model.   
 
Table 4.   Regression Statistics for US Military Personnel Spending and Total FMS 
Agreements 




Military Personnel (BY 
2000$M)
22308584 -105 * Military 
Personnel (BY 2000$M)
0.0960
Regression Goodness of Fit Statistics
 
 
The total strength of U.S. military personnel over the same period was also 
examined for possible association between the strength numbers and total FMS spending. 
US Military Manpower data series are in total number of personnel, while the Total FMS 
agreements are in millions of Budget Year 2000 dollars.  US.. Military Manpower was 
divided by a factor of 10 and Total FMS agreements were multiplied by a factor of 10 for 
easier visual comparison. 
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As shown in Figure 15, the military personnel strength and FMS spending 
lines visually look more in concert than the US Military Personnel spending line in 
Figure 14, especially for the period from 1995 to 2005.  Below is the statistics of the 
linear regression of the two variables.  
  51









1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
US Military Manpower Divided by 10 Total FMS Agreements Multiplied by 10 BY 2000$M
 
Figure 15.   Comparison of US Military Manpower and Total FMS Agreements
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As illustrated in Table 5, regression statistic for the model with the US 
Military Manpower has a positive correlation, but coefficient of regression is only 15.7%.  
This figure is slightly better than the one for the US Military Personnel spending model, 
but is still too small to allow for credible conclusions.  It is possible that the relationship 
between the two variables exists, but it is extremely weak. 
 
Table 5.   Regression Statistics for U.S. Military Manpower Spending and Total FMS 
Agreements 





1027824 + 7.5 * US Military 
Manpower
0.1570
Regression Goodness of Fit Statistics
 
 
b. Operations and Maintenance 
The US military operations and maintenance (O&M) budget was the third 
economic factor that was investigated for correlation with the FMS spending by foreign 
countries.  A graphical analysis of the annual US spending on O&M and total FMS 
agreements for the period of 1980 to 2005 was performed. 
Data series for U.S. O&M spending and Total FMS agreements are in 
millions of Budget Year 2000 dollars, but FMS agreement data was multiplied by a factor 
of 10 for easier visual comparison.   
As depicted in Figure 16, the U.S. military spending on O&M line is again 
similar to the total U.S defense budget line; however, it better reflects an increase in 
expenditures due to the first Gulf War in 1991.  To further examine the possible 
correlation between the U.S O&M spending and Total FMS Agreements, linear 




Figure 16.   Comparison of U.S. Operations and Maintenance and Total FMS Agreements 









1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Operation and Maintenance (BY 2000$M) Total FMS Agreements Multiplied by 10 (BY 2000$M)
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As illustrated in Table 6, the slope of the regression equation is negative, 
indicating the negative correlation between the two variables.  The model’s coefficient of 
determination is 11.4%, which indicates an extremely weak model and leads to a 
conclusion that the amount of the U.S. O&M spending does not have an affect on the 
total amount of FMS spending for the corresponding year.   
 
Table 6.     Regression Statistics for U.S. Military O&M Spending and Total FMS 
Agreements 







20297737 -62 * Operation and 
Maintenance (BY 2000$M)
0.1140




The U.S. military procurement budget was the fourth economic factor that 
was investigated for correlation with the FMS spending by foreign countries.  Since U.S. 
procurement and FMS both represent military spending in the same category of weapons 
and weapon systems purchases, a stronger relationship might be expected for this pair of 
variables than any other economic factor. The graph of the annual U.S. spending on 
procurement and total FMS agreements data for the period of 1980 to 2005 was produced. 
Data series for U.S. procurement spending and Total FMS agreements are 
in millions of Budget Year 2000 dollars, but FMS agreement data was multiplied by a 
factor of 10 for easier visual comparison.  As depicted in Figure 17, the U.S. military 
procurement line reflects large cuts in the U.S. procurement budget covering the period 
from 1991 to 1998.  To further examine the possible association between the U.S. 
Procurement spending and Total FMS Agreements, linear regression of the two variables 
was performed. 
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Procurement BY 2000$M Total FMS Agreements Multiplied by 10 BY 2000$M
 
 
Figure 17.   Comparison of U.S. Procurement and Total FMS Agreements 
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As illustrated in Table 7, this model explains less than 1% of total 
variation in data, therefore it is safe to conclude that there is no relationship between the 
amount of the U.S. military procurement and the total amount of FMS spending for the 
corresponding year.    
 
Table 7.   Regression of U.S. Military Procurement Spending and Total FMS Agreements  






16826983 -39 * Procurement (BY 
2000$M)
0.0090
Regression Goodness of Fit Statistics
 
 
d. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
The last economic factor analyzed is the size of the U.S. Military Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) budget.  Data series for U.S. RDT&E 
spending and Total FMS agreements are in millions of Budget Year 2000 dollars, but 
FMS agreement data was multiplied by a factor of 10 for easier visual comparison.  As 
depicted in Figure 18, the U.S. military spending on RDT&E line follows the trends 
demonstrated by the first three economic factors – it increases through the 1980’s, 
plateaus during the 1990’s and starts increasing again in the 2000’s.  Also, the period 
from 1995 to 2005 has a better visual fit of two lines than other time periods. 
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation BY 2000$M Total FMS Agreements Multiplied by 10 BY 2000$M
 
Figure 18.   Comparison of U.S. RDT&E and Total FMS Agreements 
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As noted in Table 8, the coefficient of determination for this model is low 
at 18.1%.  It is possible that there is an inverted relation between the size of the U.S. 
RDT&E budget and the FMS spending, but such association is too weak to be credible.   
 
Table 8.   Regression of U.S. Military RDT&E Spending and Total FMS Agreements 





Test, and Evaluation (BY 
2000$M)
22121155 -219 * Research, 
Development, Test, and 
Evaluation (BY 2000$M)
0.1810




The analysis of U.S. budget line items and their relation to the FMS 
spending showed virtually no correlation between the amount of U.S. military spending 
and foreign country spending on FMS.  Therefore, it can be concluded that FMS 
spending is not associated with the U.S. military expenditures.      
D. INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS 
1. Two Chief Changes 
In order to identify the trends within the U.S. industrial base that influence FMS, 
there are two major areas of concern that first must be addressed. The first is the effect of 
the Post-Cold War era, with respect to the reduction in the defense budget, the reduction 
in troop levels, and the decline in DoD spending for Procurement, and RDT&E. Also 
incorporated in this area is the capacity of the defense industrial base firms 
manufacturing, producing, and procuring weapon systems, and the changes in policy 
within the acquisition and contracting process. The second is the effects of Offsets and 
the increase in competition from other countries—along with the greater use of Direct 
Commercial Sales (DCS) in lieu of U.S. Governments FMS program. 
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2.  Post Cold War Reduction 
Looking at the historical timeline, the end of the Cold War culminated with a 
decline and reduction in the size and resources within the U.S. DoD. It also was 
highlighted by DoD acquisition reform such as the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(FASA) of 1994, the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA), the Service Acquisition 
Reform Act (SARA), and the adoption of commercial best practices with the use of 
integrated product teams (IPTs).  Congressional oversight and the use of the Truth in 
Negotiation Act (TINA) had discouraged commercial businesses from dealing with the 
government in the past.  And FARA, SARA, and FASA were passed by congress and the 
DoD to lessen oversight, cost accounting standards, and provide fewer audits and 
regulations to encourage more commercial businesses to work with the government and 
compete for contracts.  At the same time, with the combination of troop-level decreases, 
defense budget declines, and a change in the U.S. Security Threat from no longer dealing 
with a major adversary, the defense industrial base for the U.S. soon began to feel the 
impact of these policy, budget and manpower decreases within the DoD transformation.  
In other words, defense industry firms had to adapt to the new post- Cold War era and the 
effects were huge. Aircraft contractors dropped from 26 to 7 in 1994; missile contractors 
dropped from 22 to 9, and tank contractors from 16 to 2 over the same time period. 63 
This rise in mergers led to a drop in numbers of contractor firms within the defense 
industrial base.  Such mergers continue to date due to the willingness of businesses to 
compete for DoD contracts.  Recent studies show that with the acquisition reform acts, 
over 39.72% of contracts are awarded to the top 10 DoD contracting firms and this trend 
will likely continue.64  Added to this is the fact that these larger yet, fewer contractors 
tend to be awarded more money on weapon procurement contracts using other than full 
and open competition.65  
                                                 
63  United States, Government Accountability Office, “Trends in DOD Spending, Industrial 
Productivity, and Competition, GAO/PEMD-97-3” (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1997). 
64 Figures and information derived from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), 2003, 5 May 
2007, <https://www.fpds.gov/>.  
65 Figures and information derived from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), 2003, 5 May 
2007, <https://www.fpds.gov/>. 
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The result of these mergers and the downsizing of the industrial force structure 
were highly publicized due to the large number of job cuts and lay-offs in the late ‘80s 
and early’90s.  DoD data estimated a 39% decrease in defense-related employment 
between 1989 and 1997, or 5% per year. 66   These jobs were lost in the funding 
drawdown; but as economists would contend, job loss does not necessarily equate to 
unemployment and/or the loss of value. Losses can be absorbed as individuals acquire 
future work in the same or in different sectors of the economy.67 The Defense Conversion 
Commission reported to the DoD “that the concept of job loss can overstate the effect of 
the Post-Cold War drawdown on employment because it does not account for the ability 
of the economy to absorb dislocated workers.”68 
Shifting to DoD spending on procurement and RDT&E, the Government 
Accounting Office reported that the impact of victory in the Cold War brought about 
massive changes in the size and resources available to the armed forces.  Since the peak 
in the defense budget in the mid 1980’s, declines in the DoD spending for procurement 
and RDT&E have had a huge effect on the industrial base and the manufacturing and 
production of weapon systems.  The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of a bi-polar 
world changed U.S. defense doctrine and reshaped the size of public and private 
businesses, departments, and facilities that worked in the defense environment. The 
procurement budget in current 2000 year dollars changed from $70,381 Million in 1985 
to $51,696 Million in 2000—a decrease of $18,685 Million or 27%.69  This decrease in 
the budget for procurement items and the increases in the competition from foreign 
countries in their pursuit of weapon sales to other countries and potential clients of the 
U.S. industrial base have placed pressure on the U.S. defense industrial base to remain 
strong and competitive.    
                                                 
66 Figures and information derived from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), 2003, 5 May 
2007, <https://www.fpds.gov/>. 
67 David Henderson, Ph.D., Economics, Naval Postgraduate School, Personal Interview, 10 Apr 2007. 
68 United States, Government Accountability Office, “Trends in DOD Spending, Industrial 
Productivity, and Competition, GAO/PEMD-97-3” (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1997). 
69 See CBO spreadsheet attached. 
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The effects of these outcomes from the post-Cold War era depict a common trend 
evident in today’s industrial base.  First, the more the defense procurement budget 
decreases, the more the defense industrial-based companies need to look to other 
countries for financial support and customer relations.  Also as countries develop 
economically, their ability to address their security needs through FMS grows.  Not only 
does the U.S. industrial base now compete for contracts within other countries, foreign 
firms are now in the market for competing FMS to other countries. For example, Defense 
Industry Daily has reported numerous competition bids for contracts—including the 2005 
winning bid awarded to Russia for 12 Sukhoi fighters, in which the Royal Thai Air Force 
had previously flow American aircrafts.  Also, a multi-billion dollar jet fighter contract is 
still being contested between Boeing, Dassault, Saab, and MiG, which shows how 
competitive the market is for competition within the defense industry. This trend may 
likely have effects on our ability to keep a higher tier of technology above other countries 
since the U.S. defense industrial-based companies will need to compensate R&D money 
to stay competitive as well as to keep our programs at an efficient market-driven level. 
3. Offsets 
In examining how Offset agreements affect FMS, we first need to define what an 
offset is.  According to the GAO, an “Offset means the entire range of industrial and 
commercial benefits provided to foreign governments as an inducement or condition to 
purchase military goods or services, including benefits such as co-production, licensed 
production, subcontracting, technology transfer, in-county procurement, marketing and 
financial assistance, and joint ventures.”70  
There are two types of Offsets: direct offsets and indirect offsets:71  A Direct 
Offset is a form of compensation to a purchaser involving goods or services that are 
directly related to the item being purchased. For example, as a condition of a U.S. sale, 
                                                 
70 United States, Government Accountability Office, “Observations on Issues Concerning Offsets, 
GAO-01-278T,” (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2000). 
71 United States, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Defense Offsets 
Disclosure Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-113, section 1243(3), (Washington D.C.: DOC, 1999) 
<http://www.bis.doc.gov/DefenseIndustrialBasePrograms/OSIES/offsets/1999DefOffDisclosureAct.htm>. 
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the contractor may agree to permit the purchaser to produce in its country certain 
components or subsystems of the item being sold.  Normally, Direct Offsets must be 
performed within a specified period.  
Indirect Offset is a form of compensation to a purchaser involving goods or 
services that are unrelated to the item being purchased.  For example, as a condition of a 
sale the contractor may agree to purchase certain of the customer’s manufactured 
products, agricultural commodities, raw materials, or services. Indirect Offsets may be 
accomplished over an expected, open-ended period of time.  
Historically, the U.S. government has maintained a “hands off” policy toward 
FMS offsets, viewing them as part of the transaction between the contracting parties. 
However, offsets are one of the many factors contributing to the globalization of the U. S. 
industrial base. 72  The use of Offsets can also result in reduced unit costs due to the 
increased size of production runs, however, as the world market gains in competitiveness 
by other countries’ industrial bases, Offsets to foreign countries can lead to decreased 
business opportunities for U.S. suppliers as well as loss of capabilities to the U.S. defense 
industrial base.73 
Looking at Offsets from the contractor’s perspective, industry officials consider 
offsets an unavoidable cost of doing business with foreign countries, since without these 
agreements, export sales would be reduced, thus, the loss of these exports would result in 
a loss to the U.S. economy and defense industrial base.74  The loss comes in the form of 
both employment within the defense industry and in the amount of production orders that 
save the DoD money–due to the decrease in unit costs as production levels increase.  At 
the same time, national security may be affected as well, due to technology transfer since 
foreign countries are requiring more and more Offsets in the form of higher technology 
transfers.  Additionally, higher Offset percentages including higher local content such as 
                                                 
72 United States, Government Accountability Office, “Observations on Issues Concerning Offsets, 
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labor requirements are being required.75  A recent GAO study examined the growth in 
demand for Offsets.  Prior to the 1990’s, many countries did not require offsets, but with 
the increase in competitiveness and economic wealth of foreign countries, these same 
countries now incorporate offset policies that give advantage to the host nations. Based 
on a study of nine U.S. companies, with 10 countries in Asia, Europe, and the Middle 
East, the GAO report found that over a 10 year time frame, demands for offsets increased 
in all participating countries.  Indeed, many of the countries were now focused on longer 
term offset deals to pursue industrial policy goals.76 
4. Direct Commercial Sales 
The use of Direct Commercial Sales is also a major factor in defining how the 
changes in the industrial base affect FMS.  As stated previously, DCS is a program 
approved by the State department that regulates private U.S. companies’ overseas sales of 
weapons and other defense articles, services, and training.  The DCS requires an export 
license issued by the office of Defense Trade Controls.  The effect that DCS has on FMS 
is profound.  According to the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 
52% of all US arms exports to the world between 1986 and 1996 were provided through 
DCS.77 
Governments tend to choose DCS over FMS for several reasons:78 
• Unlike FMS sales, DCS are negotiated directly between the foreign 
government and the U.S. arms manufacturer without the DoD serving as 
an intermediary or applying administrative costs to the purchases.  
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• FMS sales are often more expensive than DCS, though cost depends on 
many factors. For instance, less complex items or items produced by two 
or more companies are frequently cheaper when sold directly.  
• DCS sales are usually quicker than FMS, as they avoid much "red tape" 
associated with the government-to-government program.  
• DCS are also less transparent than FMS; some buyers are attracted to the 
program's relative lack of reporting requirements and audits.  
• Governments that have more experience in military procurement, and do 
not feel a need to have the U.S. government negotiate sales on their behalf, 
tend to choose DCS. 79 
Based on research conducted for this project, the Industrial base has a vital role in 
affecting the Foreign Military Sales program and vice versa.  As identified above,   
continued offsets, increases in third-world countries wealth and competition from foreign 
countries, and regulation from the US government, the US Industrial base will likely be 
affected by any increase or decrease in FMS.  The industrial base can either be hurt by 
the restriction of FMS to other countries, or it can thrive with increased orders.  However, 
the major concern is not how the Industrial base affects FMS, but on the other hand, how 
FMS affects the Industrial base.  One point of interest is identified in the research done 
on Taiwan and its FMS with the US.  Taiwan is a customer for U.S. FMS however, the 
U.S. is not the sole provider of FMS products to Taiwan.  Because of this, systems such 
as System X produced by a DoD industry leader is in competition with another country’s 
producer of System X.  In short, if Taiwan agrees to purchasing System X from the 
competitor from Country Y instead of from the U.S. firm, the U.S. firm will be left with 
this second-tier System X.  The results will most likely be lay-offs and a huge financial 
loss from lack of selling these already produced units of System X.  This is only one of 
many competitive FMS products being competed for by other nations looking to help 
their national industrial bases.  President Clinton’s Conventional Arms Transfer Policy 
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recognized the importance of economic security by making it a policy goal to enhance the 
ability of the US defense industrial base to meet US defense requirements and maintain 
long-term military technological superiority at lower costs.  Based on research for this 
project, we can conclude that as spending for procurement and RDT&E decreases, and 
the number of Defense Industry firms decrease, and as the costs for new technology and 
state-of-the-art weapon systems increase, FMS must help U.S. Defense industries stay 
technologically superior to other countries.  Such assistance is vital.  Further research 
should be conducted to examine the impact of FMS competition between countries and 
the ability to associate a monetary value with the importance of keeping the FMS 
program competitive and efficient—while at the same time safeguarding the United 
States’ ability to remain technologically superior to other nations.  
The next chapter discusses internal factors and trends within Taiwan and how 
these issues affect their use of the U.S. Foreign Military Sales programs as well as how 
the U.S. FMS program applies to Taiwan.   
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IV. CASE STUDY APPLICATION:  ANALYSIS OF TAIWAN FMS 
TRENDS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S Foreign Military Sales Program is considered vital to the safety and 
security of Taiwan.  This chapter will analyze the internal factors that affect the use of the 
U.S. FMS program as well as the factors and trends that affect how Taiwan views the 
program.  
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TAIWAN FMS 
The history of postwar United States military aid to countries in the Far East 
reflects the U.S.’s attempt to prevent and contain the spread of Chinese Communism. In 
the immediate years after the end of Word War II, the U.S. policy towards the Republic 
of China (ROC) remained ambiguous until it was too late to prevent the Chinese 
Communism advances by military and economic assistance alone. The Republic of China 
(Taiwan) was assured by President Truman that the U.S would aid it in modernizing and 
strengthening its armed forces. Aid in the form of the Lend Lease Program provided for 
39 divisions and 8 1/3 air force groups at a total cost estimated at $769 Million. The U.S. 
continued its aid in the form of military assistance even after the expiration of the 
program on June 30, 1946.80 
In 1949 the government of the Republic of China led by Generalissimo Chiang, 
Kai-Shek took its forces from the mainland of China to Taiwan and offshore islands. 
Mainland China eventually fell into Chinese Communist hands. With the Chinese 
Communists building their strength on the mainland, prospects for ROC’s tenure on 
Taiwan did not look good. The United States did not wish to become involved and 
indicated this publicly. On January 5th, 1950, President Truman announced that the 
United States would not provide military aid or advice to the ROC on Taiwan. However, 
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the breakout of the Korean War quickly resulted in a reversal of United States foreign 
policy toward Taiwan. In June of 1950, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to 
prevent any attack on Taiwan. This policy of assisting the ROC in the defense of Taiwan 
persisted until December 31, 1979, when the United States established diplomatic 
relations with the People’s Republic of China and terminated the agreement of mutual 
defense with Taiwan.81 However, the United States realized that the rise of communist 
China was becoming a serious threat to the U.S. national interests in the area. Due to its 
strategic location, Taiwan was seen as the key to the Western Pacific region and the 
National Security Strategy policy of containment. Therefore, the United States soon 
passed the Taiwan Relations Act (1979) which would, ideally, assist Taiwan in 
maintaining regional peace and containing the spread of communism.  
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) instead of the ROC.  The Taiwan Relations Act specifies that it is U.S. policy: 
• to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future “a 
threat;”  
• to contribute to the peace and security of the Western Pacific which are of 
“grave concern” to the United States;  
• “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;”  
• and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to 
force or other forms of coercion” jeopardizing the security or social or 
economic system of Taiwan’s people.  
Section 3(a) of the Taiwan Relations Act states that “the United States will make 
available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be 
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” The Act also 
specifies a congressional role in decision-making on security assistance for Taiwan. 
Section 3(b) stipulates that both the President and the Congress shall determine the nature 
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and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the 
needs of Taiwan. Section 3(b) also states, “such determination of Taiwan’s defense needs 
shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with 
recommendations to the President and the Congress.” The Taiwan Relations Act also 
established the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) as a nonprofit corporation to handle 
the relationship with Taiwan. AIT implements policy as directed by the Departments of 
Defense and State and the National Security Council (NSC) of the White House.82 
Although the diplomatic relationship between Taiwan and the U.S. was terminated in 
1979, the Taiwan Relations Act has allowed the United States to build a solid relationship 
with Taiwan based on shared values and mutual interests.  
C. PURCHASE TRENDS FROM 1950 TO 2005 
Taiwan has traditionally relied heavily on U.S. suppliers for its defense equipment 
needs. From the U.S. entry into World War II until the break in diplomatic relations in 
1979, the U.S. was a close military ally of Taiwan. Until 2004, Taiwan purchased 
advanced military equipment almost exclusively from the United States, often directly 
from the U.S. Government through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. All of the 
major U.S. defense contractors have sold equipment and/or technology to Taiwan, and 
most of these firms have well- established, long-term relationships with individuals and 
institutions in the Taiwan military. Even after the diplomatic relationship between 
Taiwan and the U.S. was terminated, the FMS delivery remained constant under the 
assurance of the Taiwan Relations Act. In fact, Taiwan has been the United States’ best 
FMS customer in the region, as Figure 19 depicts below. 
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Figure 19.   Foreign Military Sales Deliveries to Asian Customers83 
                                                 
83 FMS figures are drawn from The Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency annual facts books at the Federation of American Scientists website, 
20 Feb 2007, 28 Apr 2007 < http://www.fas.org/main/home.jsp >. 
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Since 1990, Taiwan has attempted to diversify its sources of defense equipment. 
Taiwan has ordered 60 Mirage 2000-5 fighters and six Lafayette frigates from France and 
has purchased two submarines from the Netherlands. Purchasing from new suppliers not 
only decreases Taiwan's dependence on the United States, it also wins the politically 
isolated Taiwan authorities important friends among the world's hard-pressed defense 
contractors. European defense contractors are aggressively courting Taiwan decision-
makers, and U.S. contractors will have to protect their market share. 
From worldwide sources, including the United States, Taiwan received $13.9 
billion in arms deliveries in the eight-year period from 1998 to 2005. Taiwan ranked third 
behind Saudi Arabia and China among leading recipients that are developing countries. 
Of that total, Taiwan received $9.8 billion in arms in 1998-2001 and $4.1 billion in 2002-
2005. In 2005 alone, Taiwan ranked 6th and received $1.3 billion in arms deliveries, 
while the PRC ranked 5th and received arms valued at $1.4 billion. As an indication of 
future arms acquisitions, Taiwan’s arms agreements in 2002- 2005 totaled $4.9 billion. 
The value of Taiwan’s arms agreements in 2005 alone did not place it among the top ten 
recipients that are developing countries.84  Figure 20 shows the historical pattern of FMS 
sales from 1980 to 2005; note the dramatic increase of agreements in 1993 when the U.S. 
approved the sale of 150 F-16 fighters. There is no agreement in 2005 since the defense 
budget for foreign military agreements proposed by the U.S. in 2001 is still waiting for 
resolution in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. 
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Figure 20.   Amount of U.S. Foreign Military Sales Agreements and Deliveries to Taiwan85
                                                 
85 FMS figures are drawn from The Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency annual facts books at the Federation of American Scientists website, 
20 Feb 2007, 28 Apr 2007 < http://www.fas.org/main/home.jsp >. 
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D. TAIWAN’S DEFENSE PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
Under Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense,  
The Procurement Bureau (PB) and the Defense Procurement Division (DPD), 
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO)/Washington are 
Taiwan's largest and most important official military purchasing agencies. They 
purchase most of the military equipment and supplies required by Taiwan's 
defense organizations. Other military procurement bodies, such as the military 
services' logistics commands and the Chung Shan Institute of Science and 
Technology play a relatively minor role in military purchasing abroad. Military 
organizations may purchase imported items without PB or DPD tendering bids, 
but all equipment and supplies with a purchase amount exceeding the designated 
audit ceiling of NTD50 million, approximately $1.85 million U.S. dollars, must 
be purchased through PB or DPD tenders. 86 
 
Procurements can be classified into "single review" and "divided review" tenders, 
based on differences in the procedures used to review the bids. Tender documents usually 
ask the bidders to provide three main items: qualifications of the supplier, specifications 
of the commodity, and price. If these three items are reviewed at the same time, the 
tender is defined as a "single review" tender. If the item to be procured is expensive and 
technically complex, the qualifications of the bidders and the specifications of the 
product(s) they propose to supply are usually reviewed before proposals are opened. The 
military purchasing agencies (except DPD/TECRO Washington) must publicly announce 
the invitation-to-bid in both Chinese and local English newspapers, namely the Youth 
Daily News and Central Daily News (Chinese), and the China Post and the China News 
(English). In case of restricted tenders or negotiated purchases, invitation letters are sent 
to specific firms. An invitation to bid is attached to the letter. The bidder must have its 
own copy of the invitation to bid, available at modest cost from PB/Taipei or 
DPD/Washington, D.C., to tender a bid. A bid bond of 3% of the total bid value in the 
form of cash, bank draft, certified check, bank guarantee, or letter of credit is required at 
the time of submission and will be refunded if the bid is unsuccessful. Unless otherwise 
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stipulated in the contract, within 18 days after receiving the notification of award, the 
seller must deposit a performance bond of 5% of the contract value. New-to-market 
vendors interested in presenting their product line to Taiwan's military branches must 
first contact the Procurement Bureau within the Ministry of National Defense to schedule 
a presentation. 
The primary function of the Procurement Bureau is the compilation of data and 
supplier lists which are made available to Taiwan's military branches, so defense 
contractors are strongly encouraged to submit product literature and promotional material 
to the bureau, which is also charged with making this information available to the various 
military service headquarters. 
E. DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES 
In 1980s and 1990s, Taiwan purchased Mirage jet fighters and Lafayette class 
frigates from France and Zwaardvis class submarines from the Netherlands. However, the 
procurement of Lafayette resulted in an illegal profiteering indictment of government 
officials and senior military leaders. Captain Yin, Chin-Fong, the chief of the ROC Navy 
procurement department was murdered and it was thought to be related to this scandal. 
Surprisingly, it was not until then, that the high percentage of the sales commissions had 
caught people’s attention. One new article explained: 
In 2003 the Taiwanese navy filed a suit in the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), Paris against France Thomson-CSF (now known as Thales), 
demanding that the firm return U.S. $99 Million—an amount the Navy claims is 
equivalent to the kickbacks the company received during the purchase of six 
frigates from France.”87  
The French press called it the “scandal of the century” and President Chen stated it was a 
“Nation Shaking” event and said he would conduct a full investigation until the case was 
solved. However, because the profiteering involved many people in high power, the case 
has not yet been resolved. Furthermore, the procurement of the Lafayette had upset 
China—resulting in the termination of all future sales to Taiwan.  
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  75
F. FACTORS AFFECTING THE FMS PROGRAM IN TAIWAN 
1. Political 
The political scene in the ROC is divided into two camps, with the pro-unification 
and center-right KMT, People First Party (PFP), and New Party forming the Pan-Blue 
Coalition, and the pro-independence and center-left Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
and centrist Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) forming the Pan-Green Coalition.  
This research suggests that politics is a major factor affecting FMS as seen in 
Figure 21.  Notice that the FMS agreements drop tremendously after year 2004 due to 
internal political issues in Taiwan.  
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Figure 21.   Foreign Military Sales Agreements with Regional Asian Customers88 
                                                 
88 FMS figures are drawn from The Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency annual facts books at the Federation of American Scientists website, 
20 Feb 2007, 28 Apr 2007 < http://www.fas.org/main/home.jsp >. 
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The dominant political issue in the Republic of China (Taiwan) is its relationship 
with the People’s Republic of China. Many people in the Republic of China (Taiwan) 
desire the opening of direct transportation links with the Mainland, including direct 
flights. This would aid many Republic of China (Taiwan) businesses that have opened 
factories or branches on the Mainland. Taiwan’s current Democratic Progress Party 
administration fears that such links will lead to tighter economic and political integration 
with the PRC. 
The Pan-Blue camp claims that it is not necessary to proclaim independence 
because Taiwan is already “an independent, sovereign country” and the Republic of 
China is the same as Taiwan. To the contrary, the Pan-Green camp tends to favor 
emphasizing Taiwan as being distinct from China and seeks formal Taiwanese 
independence and the dropping of the title Republic of China. Some members of the 
coalition, include the current President Chen, Shui-Bian, have moderated their views and 
claim that the ROC is nonexistent and call for the establishment of an independent 
Republic of Taiwan. 
The politicians and their parties have themselves become major political issues. 
Corruption among some DPP administration officials has been exposed. “The first lady 
had been accused of misusing state funds and the President’s son-in-law had been 
accused of inside trading.”89  The KMT was once the richest political party in the world 
and their assets continue to be an issue. The merger of the KMT and PFP was thought to 
be a done deal; however, a string of defections from the PFP to the KMT has increased 
tensions within the Pan-Blue camp.  
Many U.S. observers are disappointed that Taiwan's government has moved 
slowly in their purchase of weapons systems from the United States offerings in 
2001.  Taiwan’s inability so far to take full advantage of a substantial U.S. 
military support package approved for sale in 2001 has become an increasing 
irritant in Taiwan-U.S. relations. To date, political infighting has blocked 
legislative consideration of the arms procurement budget for purchasing much of 
the U.S. arms package. In particular, members of the opposition coalition (the 
KMT/PFP “Pan-Blue”) in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) have lodged 
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objections over: the multibillion (U.S.) dollar cost of the package (which the 
Taiwan government has pared back on several occasions in an effort to win 
support); whether the types of weapons in the package meet Taiwan’s defense 
needs; the compatibility of the proposed purchases with Taiwan’s military; and 
whether Taiwan companies can benefit or participate. In addition, some members 
in the “Pan-Blue” opposition object to Taipei’s decision to keep submitting the 
procurement budget as a free-standing “special defense” budget rather than as part 
of Taiwan’s overall annual defense budget. Commenting on the stalemate on 
October 20, 2005, Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian said that the LY’s 
continued boycott of the special defense budget was jeopardizing Taiwan’s 
future.90 
Taiwan's explanation for the procurement delays is that the process of funding 
arms acquisitions takes longer since Taiwan's political system is more democratic and 
transparent. Some defense analysts in Taiwan also have raised what they insist are 
legitimate questions about the cost, quality, and suitability of the weapons systems the 
United States has offered to sell. Taiwan's domestic political climate, including the 
antagonism between the ruling party and the opposition and the divisive issue of Taiwan's 
future relationship with China, has politicized the discussion of the proposed arms sales.  
Since President Chen took power in 2000, his intention to seek the independence 
of Taiwan was obvious, and several attempts to change the status quo had intensified the 
relationship between Taiwan and U.S. The U.S.government would prefer the 
relationships between Taiwan and China remain status quo and worries that China will be 
provoked to take action against Chen’s attempts. Chen, on the other hand, tried to use 
arms sales as a bargaining chip to ensure an elevated relationship with the U.S. However, 
even though the Democratic Progress Party has the political advantage of holding the 
executive branch, the Pan-Blue coalition has the advantage of occupying the majority of 
the Legislative Yuan and was considered the major hurdle for the approval of the defense 
budget.  Some analysts claimed that the sole reason is that the Pan-Blue coalition is 
against the defense budget and that they felt President Chen is leading the country in the 
wrong direction. Indeed, more arms sales would enhance the capability of Taiwan’s 
military forces but would also intensify and degrade their relationship with China. 
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Though many observers have claimed that Pan-Blue should take full responsibility for 
delaying the budget, it is questionable if the Pan-Blue coalition is really the problem.  
In the past, when the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party; KMT) dominated Taiwan’s 
government, the parliament swiftly approved weapons acquisition requests 
submitted by the Ministry of Defense with little argument. Increased 
democratization, however, has changed this. The process is now more 
institutionalized and transparent, and the legislature demands greater input. This 
has at least two effects that directly bear on American perceptions. First, the time 
between the supplier’s proposal of an arms sale and the legislature’s allocation of 
funds to make the purchase has grown to about two years—much longer than in 
the past. Second, the objections of Taiwan lawmakers or analysts to particular 
proposed purchases are now aired in the press….To American complaints that the 
process of approving the proposed sales is taking too long and generating too 
many objections, analysts and officials in Taiwan respond that transparency, sharp 
debate, and an often frustrating lack of speed in policymaking are hallmarks of 
democracy that Americans should recognize and respect.91  
As a result of these political tensions, FMS agreements with Taiwan dropped after 2004, 
as can be seen in Figure 21.  
2. Economic 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, Taiwan’s rapid industrialization and 
growth has been called the “Taiwan Economic Miracle”; as Taiwan developed alongside 
Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong, Taiwan was known as one of the “East Asian 
Tigers.”  However, many Taiwan officials and scholars fear that Taiwan’s era of robust 
economic growth may be coming to an end.  With Taiwan in a serious recession, a certain 
degree of economic pessimism is expected. Many Taiwan elites express concerns about 
structural, long-term economic weakness beyond the expected recovery from the present 
recession. Taiwan is at risk of losing its international competitiveness since China has 
opened its door to the world. Much of Taiwan’s assessment of the future is based on the 
economic challenge posed by China. Taiwan had long enjoyed a qualitative edge over 
China’s relatively less-developed economy. But the combination of a vast range of 
economic activities and a rapid rate of development fuels the expectation that China’s 
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firms will soon outperform foreign competitors in a variety of sectors, including those in 
which Taiwan presently excels. Many of Taiwan’s industries have already moved to the 
mainland to take advantage of cheaper labor and overhead costs. This migration of 
Taiwan’s economy to China might reach dangerous levels unless Taiwan’s economy is 
restructured.  
Economic weakness has obvious negative implication for Taiwan’s security. A 
less prosperous Taiwan is less able to support a strong military force, either through 
indigenous development and production or purchases from abroad. An economically 
weak Taiwan has less bargaining leverage with China. If Taiwan were economically 
marginalized, the international community would be less likely to support Taiwan in the 
event of military pressure or attack from China. As one analyst said, “Saudi Arabia has 
oil. Japan makes computer chips. If an attack on Taiwan would not have a great impact 
on the world economy, the world would be less responsive.”92 
Due to the economic recession, Taiwan’s ability of procuring weapons abroad has 
been weakening. In Taiwan’s parliament, legislators are delaying the defense budget 
because they think the money should be well spent.  As seen in Figure 21, it is crystal 
clear that a weaker economy in Taiwan would directly affect its purchasing power.  
G. CUSTOMERS’ PERSPECTIVE  
Taiwan, as a FMS customer, was generally satisfied with the FMS program; 
however, there were a number of specific projects which created difficulties in dealing 
with the U.S. In order to identify these problems, we arranged a site visit to Taiwan Army 
Headquarters and interviewed officers in charge of the FMS purchases. Due to 
confidentiality reasons, such as sensitivity of the systems and the political sensitivity of 
the budget process for FMS, the names of the programs below have been sanitized to 
prevent any issues or concerns arising. 
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1. Program X 
This program involves the delivery of a certain equipment package. The 
contractor delivered all the agreed-upon items of the system except the key launcher 
component prior to its filing for bankruptcy. Taiwan’s Army was still able to use the 
delivered items but the expected value of the purchase was considered ineffective since it 
failed to meet the agreed-upon contract and requirements. The program had cost Taiwan 
roughly 25 million dollars and the Taiwan Government is in the process of litigation with 
the U.S. government in hopes of reimbursement for the failed delivery of the item. 
2. Program Y 
This program concerns a lease of equipment. Taiwan had indicated the 
specification of the equipments in the Letter of Request; however, the U.S. contractor 
changed the specification twice before making the delivery. The Taiwan Army had no 
other option but to accept the deal. The lease for this equipment was set for five years, 
but after field testing and evaluation for nearly two years, the leased equipment did not 
meet the expectation and requirements outlined by the Taiwan Army and therefore 
resulted in passive termination of the lease. However, since the lease was set for five 
years, the Taiwan Army had to pay for the administrative costs, including the warehouse 
and training facilities in the U.S. The total cost for the lease is approximately 50 million 
dollars. Before the termination of the program, Taiwan had already spent 3.8 million 
dollars. Again, Taiwan is seeking litigation against the U.S. government for 
reimbursement of funds due to default by the contractor.  As of this date, the issue has not 
been resolved.  
H. OTHER ISSUES IDENTIFIED 
1. Letters of Acceptance 
The programs listed above raised several issues concerning the same problem, 
which is the format of the Letter of Acceptance. In the Security Assistance Management 
Manual (SAMM), under Letter of Acceptance Standard Terms and Conditions, Section 
  82
1.2 explains, “the Purchaser agrees that the U.S. DoD is solely responsible for negotiating 
the terms and conditions of contracts necessary to fulfill the requirements in this LOA.”93 
However, in section 7.2 it states, “The United States Government and the Purchaser agree 
to resolve any disagreement regarding this Letter of Acceptance by consultations between 
the United States Government and the Purchaser and not to refer any such disagreement 
to any international tribunal or third party for settlement.”94 The question arises, what if 
the issue can not be solved through consultation? Which department and who should 
Taiwan go to in order to settle this issue? Taiwan Army’s only window regarding FMS to 
the U.S. is through United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC). The 
way Taiwan perceives these terms is that it views the U.S. government’s willingness to 
resolve such issues as not as aggressive as it should be. “The balance is tilted toward the 
U.S. and its contractors which could create a low level of customer satisfaction for 
Taiwan. Some Taiwan analysts claim this was one of the reasons why Taiwan went 
seeking European contractors in the 1980s and 1990s.”95  However, the purchase of 
French jet fighters and frigates involved serious profiteering and scandals—which 
currently prevent Taiwan from conducting more Direct Commercial Sales.  
2. The Package Deal 
Another issue being brought by the Taiwan Army staff is in the history of FMS 
purchases with the U.S., there have been times that the Taiwan Army was compelled to 
purchase weapons or equipment which were not the most important priorities in the 
initial proposal. For instance, if the Taiwan Army plans to purchase system A, it has to be 
bought along with system B or system C. Some military officials claim that it is because 
such deals serve the purpose for the U.S. to retire second-tier weapons and equipments. 
Further, the recipient would have to purchase logistics and supplies from the U.S. defense 
contractors which would also benefit the U.S. defense industry.  “Some Taiwan 
                                                 
93 United States, Department of Defense, DoD 5105.38-M Security Assistance Management Manual 
(SAMM), (Washington D.C.: DoD, 2003) 138. 
94 United States, Department of Defense, DoD 5105.38-M Security Assistance Management Manual 
(SAMM), (Washington D.C.: DoD, 2003) 140. 
95 COL Shiao, Ten-liu, Personal Interview, 10 Apr 2007.  
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journalists and politicians have accused the Americans of profiteering, arguing that the 
United States’ position as Taiwan’s most powerful friend and almost sole weapons 
supplier allows America to practically dictate the terms of arms sales to Taipei. As one 
Taiwan newspaper editorial headline bemoaned in July 2003, “Our nation’s been picked 
clean by arms dealers.” Some Taiwan defense analysts complain that the process of 
formulating the list of weapons to be offered for sale to Taiwan is less institutionalized 
than in the past, and that it has become more common for self-interested arms 
manufacturers to intervene with the U.S. government to shape the list.”96 
3. Overpricing 
Another issue is the overpriced cost estimation for the procurement. The U.S. 
government played the roll of selecting and awarding the contractors who would make 
the delivery of the defense articles. However, the cost estimations often exceed the 
international market price. The most recent example is the budget provided by the U.S. in 
2001. The budget includes diesel-electric submarines, Patriot III air defense missiles, P-
3C maritime search/anti-submarine aircraft and other defense-related articles. The main 
issue is the cost estimation provided by the U.S. The submarine program was very 
difficult in this regard because there was no American diesel submarine in existence. The 
U.S. had to provide Taiwan with a cost estimate based on a notional design.  There was 
no existing system to point to in order to gain the support of legislators in Taiwan. This 
was also a slow and arduous process in which even good pricing data was not available 
until 2003. In addition, a Taiwan defense official argued “the price the United States was 
quoting for the eight submarines, now more than $12 Billion, was outrageously high.”97  
In contrast, “South Korea, Pakistan and India reportedly built submarines based on a 
German design for $367 Million, $317 Million and $323 Million a piece, 
                                                 
96 Denny Roy, “U.S. – Taiwan Arm Sales: The Peril of Doing Business with Friend,” Asia-Pacific 
Center for Security Studies, Cambridge: MIT Press. 3 Apr 2003: 3. 
97Senior Official, Personal Interview, 10 Apr 2007. 
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respectively. ”98 Further, there was no certainty that any European partner that owned the 
design for diesel submarines would agree to team with an U.S. contractor.  
4. Conclusion 
Taiwan, due to limited defense capabilities, will continue purchasing defense 
articles from abroad. However, with the unpleasant experience with the Lafayette and the 
political pressure from China to European countries, Taiwan can only count on the 
support from U.S. Despite the inflexibility of the LOA and the unreasonable overpricing 
of the cost, Taiwan may have no option but to accept deals offered by the U.S.  Also, the 
U.S. needs to understand the importance of maintaining the status quo between Taiwan 
and China. A large amount of FMS deliveries would provoke China and may result in 
detrimental actions against Taiwan. This might mean unbundling package deals to just 
what is needed.  The U.S. should be more sensitive to the cost and quality elements of the 
FMS program in regard to the overall satisfaction of foreign allies (customers), thus 
ensuring the defense industrial base remains viable while at the same time ensuring 
effective foreign security assistance. 
 
 
                                                 
98 Denny Roy, “U.S. – Taiwan Arm Sales: The Peril of Doing Business with Friend,” Asia-Pacific 
Center for Security Studies. Cambridge: MIT Press. 3 Apr 2003: 3. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS OF 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter answers the research questions on what factors affect the FMS 
program and identify the use of the FMS program by Taiwan.  The chapter will also 
make recommendations as to what issues and concerns within the FMS program need to 
be addressed in order to continue to provide a high degree of customer satisfaction to 
foreign countries and at the same time to properly secure U.S. national interests abroad. 
This chapter will also suggest areas for future research in the field of FMS.  
B. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Foreign Military Sales program is vital to the security of not just the 
foreign customers, but also to the national interests of the United States abroad.  The 
scope of this research has led to several general conclusions concerning the factors that 
affect FMS and what effect FMS has on Taiwan.  These specific conclusions address the 
factors outlined, and identify additional concerns and issues from recipients of FMS.  
1. Conclusion 1  
The socio/political factors that affect the FMS program are not differentiated 
by a particular party in power or any particular key players, but are 
influenced by the current threat outlined in each current administration’s 
National Security Strategy  
Based on the research conducted, there is a strong correlation between the amount 
of FMS given to a region based upon the current National Security Strategy.  Research 
has found that there is no evidence that one certain party in power influences the FMS 
program either in funding or cutbacks, however, each administration’s policy for FMS 
and security assistance is tied to the inherent current threat.  Based on data shown in 
Figure 11, the region given the most FMS funding coincided with the priority of the threat 
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to U.S. National Interests abroad.  The prevailing trend is as U.S perceives a threat, FMS 
activity is tied directly to the priority the current administration gives to that threat.  
2. Conclusion 2 
The U.S. military expenditures and manpower levels do not affect the total 
FMS spending by foreign countries. 
Based on the analysis of the U.S. Defense budget figures and amount of total 
FMS agreements for the period from 1980 to 2005, no correlation was found between the 
U.S. total and sub-category military expenditures and the amount of FMS spending by 
the foreign countries. Analysis of the U.S. military manpower levels also did not show 
any correlation with respect to the amount of FMS spending during the time period from 
1980 to 2005. 
3. Conclusion 3  
The FMS program can not only be affected by technology and the defense 
industrial base, but can also influence the strength of the industrial base and 
encourage the need for great technological innovation.  
Based on the research conducted, the defense industry and the FMS program are 
dependant upon each other.  The U.S. government uses the FMS program not only as 
means for national security interests abroad but also as a means to provide current forces 
with procurement items at a lower unit cost, while at the same time keeping the defense 
industrial base employed, strong, and profitable. FMS budget increases may help to offset 
U.S. procurement budget decreases and keep the defense industrial base employed. In 
conclusion, as new technology is developed and incorporated into new weapon systems, 
the need to rid the defense industrial base of second-tier technology systems is important 
to the strength of our industrial base.  By using the FMS program, the U.S. is not only 
helping foreign customers, but is also helping the U.S. defense industrial base and its 
national interests abroad.  However, with the rise of foreign defense industries concerns 
with customer satisfaction and the increased use of Direct Commercial Sales, the ability 
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of the U.S. to stay technologically superior as outlined in President Clinton’s foreign 
policy goal (referenced in Chapter II) is key to the vitality of the FMS program.  
4. Conclusion 4 
The FMS program, from a customer’s perspective as applied to Taiwan, is 
shaped by internal political policy, security threat, customer satisfaction and 
the recipient’s economy of scale. 
We concluded that internal politics within Taiwan and its view of its security 
needs play a vital role in funding for U.S. FMS to Taiwan.  The U.S. Government needs 
to take into account the changing of power within Taiwan’s government in order to 
facilitate procurement of defense-related articles by the Taiwan government.  The 
security threat from China continues to drive the country’s defense and need for 
procurement from FMS.  However, the current GDP of Taiwan is too small for Taiwan to 
effectively protect itself in a defense posture, therefore the need for FMS from the U.S. is 
vital to its ability to deter possible attacks on the country.  Based on the U.S. National 
Security Strategy, research also continues to show a stable and significant amount of 
funding through FMS is given to Taiwan annually.  However, overcost, 
underperformance and schedule overruns have had a detrimental effect on customer 
satisfaction. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the conclusion of this research, the following recommendations are 
made: 
1. Recommendation 1 
Conduct a survey to be completed by both the defense industrial base and the 
foreign recipients as to their satisfaction with the FMS program. 
As a result of this research, we suggest that the U.S. Government examine what 
areas of concern are surfacing from not only the customer, but also from the industrial 
base.  A survey would be helpful in understanding a road map ahead—especially in the 
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area of remaining technologically superior to foreign nations, and also to identify the 
market conditions for competition from other defense industrial bases abroad.  By 
understanding the strengths, weaknesses, and the issues and concerns from the major 
players within the FMS program, identifying, adjusting and moving forward will 
ultimately allow the U.S. to keep a higher tier of technology and a strong, prosperous 
defense industrial base. 
2. Recommendation 2 
The US should provide a more accurate cost estimation for procurement by 
foreign customers (Taiwan). 
Based on this research, we believe the U.S. may have over-priced defense-related 
articles to foreign customers (Taiwan).  The U.S. should take appropriate steps in 
analyzing their cost accounting standards when reaching agreements with recipients to 
better reflect market conditions and customer satisfaction levels.   
3. Recommendation 3 
The US should strive to better fulfill the customers (Taiwan) primary 
requirements for defense related articles. 
Through interviews of FMS officials, our research revealed that in response 
to Taiwan's efforts to procure defense articles, the U.S., in lieu of providing their 
centerpiece proposal, opted for secondary-tier substitutes which did not fully meet 
Taiwan's requirements.  The U.S., in the absence of technology transfer, should make serious 
attempts to meet foreign customers’ requirements for defense-related articles to the 





4. Recommendation 4 
The LOA should provide more flexibility in order to meet customer needs. 
Based on research and regulations outlined in the Security Assistance 
Management Manual, the current format of the Letter of Acceptance creates an 
imbalance between the U.S. and recipients.  In reviewing the LOA, the U.S. does not take 
ownership or responsibility for any issues or concerns that may arise from the outcome of 
the procurement process.  To better encourage stronger relationships from the recipient, 
the U.S. should review the current LOA and make appropriate adjustments to ensure 
equity is provided to both parties.   
D. FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS 
This project analyzed the factors that affect the FMS program and took an in-
depth look into the workings of the FMS program as applied to Taiwan.  As such, this 
study only scratches the surface of the entire FMS program and the use of Security 
Assistance to foreign nations.  The following areas are highly recommended for further 
research. 
• Investigate methods to ensure customers are receiving defense-related 
articles that meet their security assistance requirements, are delivered on 
time and are given correct cost estimations.   
• Research and analyze the “value” of the FMS program.  This analysis 
could develop a model which assigns a non-monetary value to aspects of 
the FMS program in an effort to determine if the FMS program adds value.   
• Evaluate the ramifications of customer dissatisfaction with the FMS 
program.  This research could identify the possible outcomes that may 
result from lack of customer satisfaction from recipients of the FMS.   
• Research and analyze whether FMS makes for a safer world.  This 
analysis could develop and apply a model to evaluate and answer this 
question. 
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• Investigate whether direct commercial sales should take the place of the 
FMS program, or whether DCS should be absorbed by the FMS program. 
 
  91
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Akaka, D. K.(2005, June 15) US Senator for Hawaii. Newsroom. Retrieved May 7, 2007, 
from http://akaka.senate.gov/public/index.cfm. 
Chang, R., Hsiu-chuan, S. & Huang, J. (2006, June 13). Taiwan to offer deal to France on 
Lafayette case: report. Taipei Times, p. 1. 
Congressional Research Service. (2001). CRS report for congress, Order code RS20365. 
Washington, DC: author. 
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. Defense Institute of International 
Legal Studies. Retrieved May 10, 2007, from http://www.dsca.mil/diils/.   
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. DISAM mission statement. 
Retrieved May 10, 2007, from http://www.disam.dsca.mil/. 
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. (2006, October). DISAM’S online 
green book, Appendix 2. History of security assistance. Retrieved April 21, 2007, 
from http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/20%20Appendix%202.pdf.  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. (2006, October). DISAM’S online 
green book, Chapter 5. Retrieved April 21, 2007, from 
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/05%20Chapter.pdf. 
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. (2006, October). DISAM’S online 
green book, Chapter 6. Retrieved May 1, 2007, from 
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/06%20Chapter.pdf. 
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. (2006, October). DISAM’S online 
green book, Chapter 9. Retrieved May 1, 2007, from 
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/greenbook.htm. 
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. (2006, October). DISAM’S online 
green book, Chapter 15. Retrieved April 21, 2007, and May 1, 2007, from 
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/15%20Chapter.pdf. 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2007, March). Business operations/comptroller 
directorate. Retrieved May 10, 2007, from 
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/Comptroller/comptroller.htm. 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2007, March).Directorate for information 
technology. Retrieved May 10, 2007, from 
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/IT/info_tech_dir.htm. 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2007, April 3). Foreign military sales. Retrieved 
May 10, 2007, from http://www.dsca.osd.mil/home/foreign_military_sales.htm. 
  92
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (1999, December 13). Foreign military sales 
(FMS) financial management. Retrieved May 4, 2006, from 
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/DSCA_ memoranda/DSCA%20_00-
19/Hamre_Dec_99_memo.pdf. 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2006, April). How does FMS operate. 
Frequently asked questions. Retrieved April 3, 2007, from 
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/PressReleases/faq.htm#How%20Does%20FMS%20Ope
rate. 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2007, March).Operations directorate. Retrieved 
May 10, 2007, from 
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/Country_Programs/cntry_programs.htm.  
Defense Security Cooperation Agency.(2007, March). Organization chart. Retrieved 
April 3, 2007, from http://www.dsca.mil/organization.htm. 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2007, March). Program directorate. Retrieved 
May 10, 2007, from http://www.dsca.mil/programs/pgm/index.htm. 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency.(2007, March). Strategy directorate. Retrieved 
May 10, 2007, from 
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/Program_Support/psd_org.htm. 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2004, January 21). The FMS advantage: 
Frequently asked questions about foreign military sales. Full Color Brochure. 
Retrieved May 10, 2007, from http://www.dsca.osd.mil/about_us.htm. 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2005, March 8). Welcome to DSCA. Overview 
Presentation. Retrieved May 10, 2007, from 
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/about_us.htm.  
Department of Defense. (1993). Defense Security Assistance Agency fiscal year series. 
Washington, DC: author, 10-11. 
Department of Defense. (2003). Security assistance management manual (SAMM) (DoD 
5105.38-M). Washington, DC: author, 138, 140. 
Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency. (2007, February 20). Annual facts 
books at the Federation of American Scientists website. Retrieved April 28, 2007, 
from http://www.fas.org/main/home.jsp. 
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). (2003). Various figures and information 
derived from this site. Retrieved May 5, 2007, from https://www.fpds.gov/. 
Government Accountability Office. (2003). Foreign military sales; Air Force does not 
use controls to prevent spare parts containing sensitive military technology from 
being released to foreign countries (GAO-03-939R). Washington, DC: author. 
  93
Government Accountability Office. (2003). Foreign military sales; Improved Air Force 
controls could prevent unauthorized shipments of classified and controlled spare 
parts to foreign countries (GAO-03-664). Washington, DC: author. 
Government Accountability Office. (2000). Foreign military sales; Changes needed to 
correct weaknesses in end-use monitoring program (GAO/NSIAD-00-208). 
Washington, DC: author. 
Government Accountability Office. (2000). Observations on issues concerning offsets 
(GAO-01-278T). Washington, DC: author. 
Government Accountability Office. (1997). Trends in DoD spending, industrial 
productivity, and competition (GAO/PEMD-97-3). Washington, DC: author. 
Government Accountability Office. (1996). Offset demands continue to grow 
(GAO/NSIAD 96-65). Washington, DC: author. 
Government Accountability Office. (1979). Improperly subsidizing foreign military sales 
program; A continuing problem (FGMSD-79-16). Washington, DC: author. 
Grimmett, R. (2005, December 29). Arms sales agreements with and deliveries to major 
clients 1997-2004 (Report RL33217). Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service.  
Grimmett, R. R. (2004). Conventional arms transfers to the developing nations, 1996-
2003. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.   
Henderson, D., PhD, Economics. (2007, April 10). [Personal interview with researchers 
at Naval Postgraduate School]. 
Hovey, H. A. (1965). United States military assistance: A study of policies and practices. 
Westport: Frederick A. Praeger publishers.  
Lagon, M. P. (1994). The Reagan doctrine: Sources of American conduct in the Cold 
War’s last chapter. Westport: Praeger Publishers. 
McCaffery, J.L, & Jones, L.R. (2004). Budgeting and financial management for national 
defense. Greenwich: Information Age Publishing, 73. 
Ministry of National Defense Office (Republic of China). (2007). Retrieved April 24, 
2007, from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/mnd.htm.   
NSC. (1983). US Relations with the USSR (National Security Decision Directive 75). 
Retrieved May 11, 2007, from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-075.htm. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director of Administration and Management, 
Directorate for Organizational and Management Planning. (2007, March). The 
Department of Defense organizational structure. Retrieved May 10, 2007, from 
http://www.dod.mil/odam/omp/pubs/GuideBook/DoD.htm#Defense%20Agencies. 
  94
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics. 
(1990, 16 April). Offsets. Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy. Retrieved 
May 1, 2007, from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/paic/international/contracting/offsets/index.htm.  
Roy, D. (2003, March). Taiwan’s threat perception: The enemy within. Asia-Pacific 
Center for Security Study. Cambridge: MIT Press, 4.  
Roy, D. (2003, April 3). US–Taiwan arm sales: The peril of doing business with a friend. 
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Study, Cambridge: MIT Press, 3. 
Ruebner, J. (2003, February 11). Ratheon-Israel-Congress. CounterPunch. Retrieved 
May 10, 2007, from http://www.counterpunch.org/ruebner02112003.html.  
Shiao, T-l, COL. (2007, April 10). [Personal interview with researchers]. 
Stockholm International Research Institute. The SIPRI arms transfers database—Access. 
Retrieved May 5, 2007, from 
http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/access.html#twenty. 
Truman Presidential Museum and Library. (1990). Student activity: Harry Truman and 
the Truman Doctrine. Retrieved May 8, 2007, from 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/teacher/doctrine.htm. 
United States, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division. (2006, October 9). CRS 
report to congress—Taiwan: Recent developments and US policy choices. 
Washington, DC: CRS, 8. 
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (1997, revised 1999). Revision of US arms 
exports data series. World military expenditures and arms transfers 1997. 
Washington, DC: author. 
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (1995). World military expenditure and 
arms transfers 1995. Washington, DC: author.  
US Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division. (2006, October 9). CRS report to 
Congress—Taiwan: Recent developments and US policy choices. Washington, 
DC: CRS. 
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security. (1999). Defense Offsets 
Disclosure Act of 1999 (Pub. L. 106-113, section 1243(3)). Washington, DC: 
DOC, 1999. Retrieved February 12, 2007, from 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/DefenseIndustrialBasePrograms/OSIES/offsets/1999Def
OffDisclosureAct.htm. 
US Department of State. (1984). Country reports on human rights practices for 1984. 
Report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate. 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 
  95
US Department of State. (1997, September). Department of Defense, Foreign Military 
Assistance Act Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1996. Washington, DC: author.  
US Government Printing Office.(2006, October) Defense outlays are drawn from the 
following website. Retrieved February 21, 2007, from 
www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/sheets/hist02z1.xls. 
Voirst, Milton (1999, August 18) Country briefing: Saudi Arabia. Jane's Defense Weekly, 
Washington D.C.: 30.  
Yeh, A-S. (1998, September). A study of the US foreign military sales and ROC 







THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  97










Defense as a %
of Total












1980 2,726.7 590,941 133,995 22.67% 4.91% 40,897 44,788 29,021 13,127 2,050,826
1981 3,054.7 678,241 157,513 23.22% 5.16% 47,941 51,878 35,191 15,278 2,082,897
1982 3,227.6 745,743 185,309 24.85% 5.74% 55,170 59,673 43,271 17,729 2,108,612
1983 3,440.7 808,364 209,903 25.97% 6.10% 60,886 64,881 53,624 20,552 2,123,349
1984 3,840.2 851,853 227,413 26.70% 5.92% 64,158 67,329 61,879 23,113 2,138,157
1985 4,141.5 946,396 252,748 26.71% 6.10% 67,842 72,336 70,381 27,099 2,151,032
1986 4,412.4 990,441 273,375 27.60% 6.20% 71,511 75,255 76,517 32,279 2,169,112
1987 4,647.1 1,004,083 281,999 28.09% 6.07% 72,020 76,167 80,743 33,592 2,174,217
1988 5,008.6 1,064,481 290,361 27.28% 5.80% 76,337 84,436 77,164 34,788 2,138,213
1989 5,400.5 1,143,829 303,559 26.54% 5.62% 80,676 86,960 81,619 36,997 2,130,229
1990 5,735.4 1,253,130 299,331 23.89% 5.22% 75,622 88,294 80,972 37,454 2,046,144
1991 5,935.1 1,324,331 273,292 20.64% 4.60% 83,439 101,715 82,028 34,585 1,986,259
1992 6,239.9 1,381,649 298,350 21.59% 4.78% 81,171 91,939 74,880 34,628 1,807,177
1993 6,575.5 1,409,522 291,086 20.65% 4.43% 75,904 94,036 69,935 36,964 1,705,103
1994 6,961.3 1,461,907 281,642 19.27% 4.05% 73,137 87,868 61,768 34,759 1,610,490
1995 7,325.8 1,515,884 272,066 17.95% 3.71% 70,809 91,017 54,981 34,590 1,518,224
1996 7,694.1 1,560,608 265,753 17.03% 3.45% 66,669 88,711 48,913 36,490 1,471,722
1997 8,182.4 1,601,307 270,505 16.89% 3.31% 69,724 92,408 47,690 37,011 1,438,562
1998 8,627.9 1,652,685 268,207 16.23% 3.11% 68,976 93,412 48,206 37,416 1,406,830
1999 9,125.3 1,702,035 274,785 16.14% 3.01% 69,503 96,344 48,826 37,359 1,385,703
2000 9,709.8 1,789,216 294,394 16.45% 3.03% 75,950 105,812 51,696 37,602 1,420,084
2001 10,057.9 1,863,190 304,759 16.36% 3.03% 73,977 111,964 54,986 40,455 1,421,056
2002 10,377.4 2,011,153 348,482 17.33% 3.36% 86,799 130,005 62,515 44,389 1,451,635
2003 10,808.6 2,160,117 404,778 18.74% 3.74% 106,744 151,408 67,926 53,098 1,434,377
2004 11,517.5 2,293,006 455,847 19.88% 3.96% 113,576 174,045 76,216 60,759 1,426,836
2005 12,265.8 2,472,205 495,326 20.04% 4.04% 127,463 188,118 82,294 65,694 1,389,394




























1980 $5,287,977 $2,162,188 $214,013 $33,853 $807,290 $161,476 $609,198 $567,034 $879,631 $403,766 $24,009,453 $11,103,982
1981 $1,786,353 $2,496,410 $60,387 $82,643 $964,253 $530,426 $438,914 $513,702 $540,387 $652,096 $11,250,129 $13,299,005
1982 $8,121,310 $3,498,841 $44,005 $38,033 $667,065 $535,723 $1,080,050 $346,153 $851,303 $627,232 $26,650,681 $14,224,485
1983 $1,190,650 $5,663,518 $568,599 $129,102 $423,874 $596,334 $495,766 $460,644 $1,066,291 $600,792 $22,118,531 $16,409,753
1984 $3,880,365 $3,132,102 $14,508 $48,489 $272,268 $495,636 $228,511 $370,950 $1,049,125 $444,645 $18,418,682 $12,198,697
1985 $3,527,443 $1,959,578 $403,456 $31,736 $414,223 $558,000 $260,591 $373,337 $992,857 $486,534 $14,818,844 $10,823,069
1986 $956,909 $3,079,042 $57,265 $189,160 $289,540 $211,321 $218,638 $480,295 $709,829 $341,454 $8,499,428 $10,081,806
1987 $866,971 $3,920,772 $42,350 $195,302 $384,976 $326,977 $203,229 $469,855 $689,929 $487,798 $8,081,990 $14,327,624
1988 $2,105,675 $1,242,821 $19,201 $252,442 $1,046,043 $288,538 $499,467 $431,562 $660,809 $666,897 $14,282,330 $11,564,494
1989 $1,409,168 $784,562 $57,658 $45,354 $323,991 $262,509 $443,106 $401,563 $663,661 $500,582 $11,173,461 $9,152,303
1990 $11,155,120 $1,068,984 $34,329 $54,057 $1,722,389 $332,201 $572,351 $400,646 $611,951 $556,284 $20,322,236 $9,423,947
1991 $10,487,508 $3,215,557 $90,165 $73,037 $840,750 $607,137 $460,717 $265,999 $555,437 $643,286 $19,687,861 $10,232,346
1992 $1,008,132 $2,717,308 $40,234 $27,659 $371,839 $651,326 $2,641,740 $352,439 $545,207 $811,592 $14,306,391 $11,490,781
1993 $11,707,317 $3,819,308 $104,471 $87,053 $1,491,030 $420,699 $241,210 $336,411 $6,124,006 $905,182 $31,680,516 $12,452,286
1994 $1,711,069 $2,063,200 $583,012 $94,522 $782,935 $848,801 $378,668 $413,223 $389,728 $920,014 $13,679,905 $10,661,243
1995 $465,586 $3,812,039 $194,649 $62,584 $615,738 $740,426 $463,008 $472,030 $470,998 $1,423,558 $9,079,234 $12,931,370
1996 $1,251,040 $2,970,826 $316,964 $84,075 $498,660 $788,851 $847,702 $356,086 $991,137 $868,990 $9,412,086 $12,314,342
1997 $542,301 $4,736,131 $183,392 $136,561 $310,924 $637,854 $769,871 $524,082 $1,170,681 $2,438,148 $8,408,943 $16,294,591
1998 $2,121,356 $4,288,293 $166,258 $236,859 $334,875 $418,356 $293,583 $903,103 $1,334,927 $1,451,036 $8,689,600 $14,040,551
1999 $793,334 $4,383,584 $672,866 $556,605 $210,939 $443,684 $533,589 $592,919 $1,165,140 $2,512,709 $11,201,155 $16,927,384
2000 $656,444 $1,987,467 $102,962 $131,039 $491,166 $460,230 $500,290 $1,399,002 $717,531 $783,767 $10,820,154 $10,671,734
2001 $668,476 $1,857,457 $597,421 $239,949 $343,820 $484,630 $745,128 $722,299 $1,094,775 $1,139,135 $12,456,912 $12,059,194
2002 $829,859 $1,274,501 $143,001 $410,377 $950,736 $454,838 $1,791,434 $512,147 $715,809 $1,374,172 $11,839,264 $10,168,512
2003 $630,348 $977,404 $155,640 $162,693 $741,804 $415,888 $468,287 $534,604 $1,394,999 $625,342 $12,202,560 $8,899,950
2004 $1,688,649 $1,157,730 $133,886 $193,895 $642,902 $374,308 $327,141 $560,727 $2,117,314 $862,800 $12,388,689 $10,219,646
2005 $688,236 $928,435 $82,982 $193,549 $821,236 $382,946 $370,345 $561,532 $225 $1,318,341 $8,758,534 $10,256,474




































1980 $3,803,554 $2,061,910 $11,362,205 $4,533,620 $8,354,956 $4,062,365 $66,892 $86,820 $279,238 $256,981 $142,605 $102,286
1981 $3,116,881 $3,273,249 $3,397,704 $5,425,968 $3,796,377 $4,042,142 $161,975 $125,290 $556,985 $233,513 $220,205 $198,843
1982 $7,680,633 $2,063,411 $14,348,821 $7,216,961 $3,082,087 $4,014,013 $240,487 $200,244 $1,110,439 $436,326 $184,969 $293,532
1983 $3,146,590 $2,649,966 $7,595,602 $8,953,608 $10,868,631 $4,133,916 $78,274 $110,950 $378,504 $388,848 $50,620 $172,467
1984 $2,293,038 $2,255,484 $5,857,843 $5,319,752 $9,274,694 $3,591,469 $161,032 $115,444 $731,108 $605,790 $100,967 $310,758
1985 $3,422,477 $2,428,969 $5,213,483 $4,524,325 $5,068,535 $2,934,401 $160,131 $111,394 $874,638 $646,481 $79,584 $177,500
1986 $2,482,284 $2,026,676 $2,522,739 $4,712,204 $2,708,842 $2,549,166 $151,343 $104,748 $515,599 $581,089 $118,620 $107,924
1987 $2,364,623 $2,507,685 $2,462,419 $7,715,017 $2,473,511 $3,438,829 $76,836 $91,327 $587,426 $492,892 $117,172 $81,875
1988 $2,899,374 $3,355,293 $8,919,314 $3,428,078 $1,705,229 $3,973,061 $67,898 $110,202 $624,437 $611,667 $66,079 $86,196
1989 $1,934,338 $2,596,272 $6,646,103 $2,045,571 $1,847,629 $3,860,974 $41,684 $99,177 $618,553 $476,993 $85,153 $73,318
1990 $3,623,384 $2,344,593 $13,339,189 $3,046,272 $2,830,896 $3,452,814 $33,534 $57,711 $411,844 $441,538 $83,389 $81,024
1991 $2,543,960 $2,201,903 $13,044,215 $4,682,919 $2,546,882 $2,795,531 $19,011 $39,755 $456,673 $413,544 $84,638 $98,695
1992 $4,214,243 $2,288,184 $2,839,030 $6,070,927 $5,635,484 $2,579,443 $18,038 $31,469 $416,713 $458,894 $65,488 $61,864
1993 $8,774,589 $2,266,571 $15,557,791 $7,235,139 $6,243,521 $2,415,788 $20,041 $17,255 $319,000 $462,355 $165,823 $55,179
1994 $3,435,789 $2,933,123 $5,019,966 $3,929,727 $4,387,257 $3,351,147 $12,916 $18,917 $348,314 $368,743 $76,932 $59,587
1995 $2,160,613 $3,507,204 $2,429,383 $6,809,958 $3,640,661 $2,235,589 $4,928 $14,871 $335,175 $304,349 $64,880 $59,399
1996 $3,084,757 $2,770,952 $3,923,641 $5,702,162 $2,118,544 $3,371,396 $8,958 $26,394 $237,084 $358,911 $38,086 $84,519
1997 $2,953,992 $4,170,700 $2,098,991 $7,821,097 $2,950,407 $3,949,438 $10,634 $10,632 $304,859 $212,637 $45,247 $68,323
1998 $2,383,795 $3,497,212 $4,300,374 $6,708,508 $1,700,299 $3,481,613 $12,805 $12,813 $186,849 $298,889 $35,219 $102,432
1999 $3,086,048 $4,618,899 $5,316,994 $6,692,908 $2,572,023 $5,331,806 $10,519 $10,384 $151,216 $218,518 $64,910 $54,789
2000 $2,515,240 $3,662,365 $3,676,507 $4,050,694 $4,134,308 $2,664,066 $11,219 $11,959 $429,833 $221,410 $56,722 $61,313
2001 $3,056,658 $3,118,773 $5,649,053 $4,413,252 $3,508,357 $3,934,528 $16,244 $9,027 $189,980 $453,412 $36,583 $51,010
2002 $3,887,824 $3,205,224 $4,864,676 $4,103,849 $2,263,215 $2,625,615 $19,727 $7,683 $763,739 $188,686 $39,596 $37,447
2003 $3,267,992 $2,117,120 $2,991,183 $3,077,246 $5,521,042 $3,383,648 $40,144 $10,205 $332,606 $225,289 $48,642 $84,509
2004 $3,783,820 $2,479,780 $5,570,821 $3,959,841 $2,654,600 $3,594,385 $22,944 $21,883 $308,483 $222,836 $48,007 $35,517
2005 $1,727,656 $2,991,228 $3,372,930 $4,555,001 $2,822,759 $2,229,438 $20,148 $25,401 $636,967 $398,504 $51,832 $56,904
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APPENDIX B. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA 
SOURCES 
Dependent Variable 
Credible annual FMS figures are not easily available—either through the 
common research channels (databases, search engines, scientific publications, etc.), or 
through direct contact with the US government agencies (such as the Defense Institute 
of Security Assistance Management) that are responsible for implementing and 
conducting FMS.    
The following method was used to generate a FMS data column.  First, all 
annual FMS figures from 1980 to 2005 were extracted from the Department of 
Defense Security Assistance Agency annual fact books in PDF format found on the 
Federation of American Scientists website99.    The assumption was made that the 
data for the given years was not normalized to the common base year and was 
provided in current year dollars; for example, the total value of FMS agreements in 
1983 was provided in CY83 dollars.  FMS data was then normalized to the base year 
2000 using Defense Wide Procurement inflation indices (BY2007)100.  Normalization 
of FMS data took out inflation effects and allowed comparisons of FMS spending 
from one year to another.  The described method of compiling FMS data was verified 
by Mr. Frank Campanell from the Defense Institute of Security Assistance 
Management101.      
                                                 
99 FMS figures are drawn from The Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency annual 
facts books at the Federation of American Scientists website, 20 Feb 2007, 28 Apr 2007 < 
http://www.fas.org/main/home.jsp >. 
100 Naval Center of Cost Analysis website, 18 Feb 2007  
<http://www.ncca.navy.mil/services/inflation.cfm>. 
101 Telephone interview 12 Mar 2007, DSN 785-5639, email: fcampanell@disam.wpafb.af.mil. 
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FMS data included figures for annual dollar value of FMS deliveries and 
annual dollar value of FMS agreements.  For the purpose of the regression analysis, 
the annual dollar value of FMS agreements was used.  The dependent variable is 
called “Total FMS Agreements.”    
Independent Variables 
Regression analysis used US budget data from the US Government Printing 
Office102.  US budget data was provided in millions of BY2000 dollars.   
US military manpower strength figures were taken from US Department of 
Defense Personnel and Procurement Statistics103. 
In some cases, various data series were multiplied or divided by a factor of 10 
or 100 to allow for better comparison in graphical representation. 
                                                 
102 Defense outlays are drawn from the US Government Printing Office website, 21 Feb 2007 
<www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/sheets/hist02z1.xls>. 
103 US Department of Defense Personnel and Procurement Statistics website, 14 March 2007 
<http://siadapp.dior.whs.mil/personnel/MILITARY/Miltop.htm>. 
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APPENDIX C. LIST OF FREQUENTLY USED ACRONYMS 
• AECA    Arms Export Control Act  
• CAS    Cost Accounting Standards 
• DCS    Defense Commercial Sales 
• DSCA    Defense Security and Cooperation Agency 
• FAR    Federal Acquisition Regulation 
• FARA    Federal Acquisition Reform Act  
• FMS    Foreign Military Sales 
• LOA    Letter of Offer and Acceptance  
• LOR    Letter of Requirement  
• SARA    Service Acquisition Reform Act 
• TINA    Truth in Negotiation Act 
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